You read it here first. During the upcoming proxy season, there is going to be hysteria over the executive compensation disclosures in proxies for companies with defined benefit (DB) plans, especially those with nonqualified plans for their named executive officers (NEOs).
What's going on? As part of an NEO's compensation, filers are required to include the increase in the actuarial present value of DB plans. The actuarial present value is a discounted value of the anticipated payment stream just as it was a year earlier. While there are many assumptions that actuaries select in determining an actuarial liability, two, in particular, have changed for many companies from 12/31/2013 to 12/31/2014. One is the discount rate which will have decreased by somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 basis points and the other is the mortality assumption. Late last year, the Society of Actuaries (SOA) released its newest mortality study and many companies elected to adopt the new tables.
The effect of the change in discount rate will vary, largely on the age of the NEO in question, but it's not unreasonable to think that for most NEOs that just that discount rate change will have increased the actuarial liability attributed to them by 8%-12%. Yes, Americans are living longer. Mortality assumptions should be updated from time to time. But, for proxy purposes, the year of the update causes an additional spike in the liability attributed to the individual NEO, perhaps an additional 5% depending upon age and gender.
So consider an NEO whose 2013 compensation included $1,000,000 due to the increase in the actuarial present value of accrued pension benefits. If that person is still an NEO at the end of 2014, he or she will have had an increase in liability due to surviving one more year (interest and mortality totaling perhaps 6%), an increase due to increases in included compensation (a large bonus could have increased even 3-to-5 year average compensation by 25% (recall that in the case of a 5-year average that 2014 which was a good year for many businesses replaces 2009 which was a dismal year for many businesses)), and increases due to changes in discount rates and mortality assumptions.
So, with no changes in compensation practices, our NEO who had $1,000,000 of compensation attributable to him or her in 2013 might see that turned into an increase of $1,500,000 in 2014.
There will be outrage. Proponents of the pay ratio rule of Dodd-Frank Section 953(b) will point to these increases and say that the rank-and-file got 2%-4% increases. The media will not understand what happened. Congress, and this might be the year that it matters as the new Republican control has suggested that it will try to repeal some parts of Dodd-Frank, will not understand.
But those people who chose to read my ramblings will get it. Companies that foresee the issue can address it. It can't be solved in its entirety, but it can be managed.
I know how.
Do you?
What's new, interesting, trendy, risky, and otherwise worth reading about in the benefits and compensation arenas.
Wednesday, January 7, 2015
Thursday, January 1, 2015
I've Joined The Savitz Organization
Effective January 1, 2015, I've joined The Savitz Organization in their Dunwoody, GA (Atlanta) office. I'll be a consulting actuary with additional responsibility for business development and the growth of the Atlanta office. I'd love to meet with you in person to discuss your needs. Please e-mail me or call me (for the time being, it will have to be my personal e-mail or phone).
http://www.savitz.com
Happy New Year to all.
http://www.savitz.com
Happy New Year to all.
Thursday, December 18, 2014
Federal Spending Bill Brings Multiemployer Pension Changes in Through the Back Door
It never seems to fail -- Congress needs a way to spend money or make a bill budget-neutral and pensions are the ugly stepsister. I expressed my opinion on this just last month. So, what did they do this time? Our legislators appear to have found a different stepsister this time in multiemployer pensions. I'll talk more about what happened later, but first I'll provide some background for people who aren't as familiar with multiemployer plans. For those who like names, the new law is known as the Multiemployer Pension Plan Reform Act of 2014 (MEPPRA, until someone gives me a better name).
Multiemployer pension plans were authorized by the Taft-Hartley Act. In such an arrangement often found in industries where individuals may perform jobs for a variety of different employers (construction, trucking, mining, etc), employers contribute a negotiated amount of money per unit (hour worked, mile driven, etc) of work. Unlike single-employer plans, multiemployer plans are run by a group of trustees evenly balanced among collective bargaining units or unions and management. Benefit levels are theoretically set when the trustees determine that the plan's assets are sufficient to support an increase. And, once employers choose to participate in a multiemployer plan through the collective bargaining process, it may be difficult to exit as withdrawing sponsors are subject to significant payments known as withdrawal liability.
The first really significant changes to multiemployer rules came into being with the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act in 1980. The rules were largely unchanged until our legislators saw fit to treat well funded multiemployer plans differently from more poorly funded plans in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA). PPA introduced the colored zones dependent theoretically on a plan's level of danger of not being able to support its own benefit promises.
So, what does MEPPRA do and what level of concern should participating employers have? As is often the case these days, one of the primary purposes of MEPPRA is to protect the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the governmental agency that protects private pension benefits.
One of the most important tenets of ERISA-covered pension plans has been that benefits accrued by a participant cannot be reduced by plan amendment. This has long been one of the sacred cows of defined benefit plans (DB). Under MEPPRA, certain very poorly funded plans may be able to reduce accrued benefits of participants including those who are already retired and are receiving benefits. Such reductions are subject to a "rejection vote" by plan participants (active and no longer active), but in the case of "systemically important plans" (those where the PBGC projects it will be on the hook for at least $1 billion), the Treasury Department can override the vote of plan participants.
At the same time, premiums paid to the PBGC on behalf of each plan participant will double next year from $13 per participant to $26, further demonstrating PBGC's influence on our legislators. And, in a move that I think could bring further controversy when the rule is applied, the PBGC will have the ability to "facilitate" mergers of two multiemployer plans in order to improve their aggregate funded status.
Consider that last provision. As an example, let's say that there are two widgetmakes multiemployer pension plans and that the one for workers in states with at least four vowels in the names of those states is poorly funded while the one for workers in more vowel-challenged states is pretty well funded. In an effort to improve the aggregate funding, the PBGC comes in and facilitates a merger of the two plans. As a worker, how would you feel if you were suddenly in a poorly funded plan when you had not been previously. Perhaps the reason is that the people in the other plan have much better benefits than you do. So, the previously responsible management of your plan will be bailing out the less responsible management of the other plan. That might just make you want to say "Hmm" or perhaps something worse.
There are a number of other changes that are highly technical related to funding and to withdrawal liability (the amounts that an employer who chooses to cease participating in the plan must pay in order to get out) calculations, but these are quite complex and far beyond the scope of most readers. And, in case you were wondering, reading about those calculations will not bring chills of excitement.
All that said, what should an employer do to react to the passage of MEPPRA? There is no perfect strategy, but for employers participating in reasonably well funded plans (green zone), there should not be much that is needed. For the remainder (red zone or yellow zone) of plans, however, employers may need to weigh their options. They might consider doing some or all of the following:
Multiemployer pension plans were authorized by the Taft-Hartley Act. In such an arrangement often found in industries where individuals may perform jobs for a variety of different employers (construction, trucking, mining, etc), employers contribute a negotiated amount of money per unit (hour worked, mile driven, etc) of work. Unlike single-employer plans, multiemployer plans are run by a group of trustees evenly balanced among collective bargaining units or unions and management. Benefit levels are theoretically set when the trustees determine that the plan's assets are sufficient to support an increase. And, once employers choose to participate in a multiemployer plan through the collective bargaining process, it may be difficult to exit as withdrawing sponsors are subject to significant payments known as withdrawal liability.
The first really significant changes to multiemployer rules came into being with the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act in 1980. The rules were largely unchanged until our legislators saw fit to treat well funded multiemployer plans differently from more poorly funded plans in the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA). PPA introduced the colored zones dependent theoretically on a plan's level of danger of not being able to support its own benefit promises.
So, what does MEPPRA do and what level of concern should participating employers have? As is often the case these days, one of the primary purposes of MEPPRA is to protect the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the governmental agency that protects private pension benefits.
One of the most important tenets of ERISA-covered pension plans has been that benefits accrued by a participant cannot be reduced by plan amendment. This has long been one of the sacred cows of defined benefit plans (DB). Under MEPPRA, certain very poorly funded plans may be able to reduce accrued benefits of participants including those who are already retired and are receiving benefits. Such reductions are subject to a "rejection vote" by plan participants (active and no longer active), but in the case of "systemically important plans" (those where the PBGC projects it will be on the hook for at least $1 billion), the Treasury Department can override the vote of plan participants.
At the same time, premiums paid to the PBGC on behalf of each plan participant will double next year from $13 per participant to $26, further demonstrating PBGC's influence on our legislators. And, in a move that I think could bring further controversy when the rule is applied, the PBGC will have the ability to "facilitate" mergers of two multiemployer plans in order to improve their aggregate funded status.
Consider that last provision. As an example, let's say that there are two widgetmakes multiemployer pension plans and that the one for workers in states with at least four vowels in the names of those states is poorly funded while the one for workers in more vowel-challenged states is pretty well funded. In an effort to improve the aggregate funding, the PBGC comes in and facilitates a merger of the two plans. As a worker, how would you feel if you were suddenly in a poorly funded plan when you had not been previously. Perhaps the reason is that the people in the other plan have much better benefits than you do. So, the previously responsible management of your plan will be bailing out the less responsible management of the other plan. That might just make you want to say "Hmm" or perhaps something worse.
There are a number of other changes that are highly technical related to funding and to withdrawal liability (the amounts that an employer who chooses to cease participating in the plan must pay in order to get out) calculations, but these are quite complex and far beyond the scope of most readers. And, in case you were wondering, reading about those calculations will not bring chills of excitement.
All that said, what should an employer do to react to the passage of MEPPRA? There is no perfect strategy, but for employers participating in reasonably well funded plans (green zone), there should not be much that is needed. For the remainder (red zone or yellow zone) of plans, however, employers may need to weigh their options. They might consider doing some or all of the following:
- Review all of their collective bargaining agreements that cause them to be participating sponsors of multiemployer plans. Pay particular attention to the size of the plan and the plan's current zone status.
- If withdrawal from the plan is an option, request a withdrawal liability calculation to see how painful that strategy might be.
- Consider the pros and cons of remaining in the plan as part of the company's overall risk management strategy.
- Consider engaging an independent actuary (not affiliated with the plan's actuary) to assist with any strategy decisions. To the extent that the company is contemplating a strategy that could potentially inflame relations with one or more unions, it could make sense to engage this actuary through counsel.
Stay tuned. I'm sure it won't be long before pensions get to be an ugly stepsister once again.
Wednesday, December 10, 2014
Frightening Data on DC Plan Ownership
According to an article in this morning's News Dash from Plan Sponsor, fewer families had an individual account retirement plan (defined contribution or IRA) in 2013 than in 2010. However, on the bright side, average account balances have increased over the same period.
What do we learn from this? It's difficult to know for sure, but as is my wont on my blog, I'm going to take a shot at working it out.
Why are average account balances up? Well, the equity markets have performed pretty well over the last few years. Combine that with the fact that there has been time for additional contributions to those accounts and this makes sense. When we combine this, however, with my rationale for the prevalence of accounts decreasing, it may look troubling.
That the number of families with individual account retirement plans is decreasing suggests underlying issues with the economy. What I suspect is that many long-term unemployed or under-employed have had to liquidate accounts that they had a few years ago in order to survive. People laid off from jobs have taken distributions rather than rollovers to live on. I suspect that more often than not, these have been total distributions from smaller accounts. By eliminating some of the smaller account balances, the average and median accounts have grown in size.
That only about 50% of families have individual retirement accounts and only about 65% have any retirement plan at all is not good news for our future economy. How will the remaining 35% live? Moreover, among those 65%, will they have enough to survive in retirement?
The way it looks to me is that for people who are able to fully utilize their 401(k) or other retirement program for their entire working lifetimes, retirement may be comfortable. But this data suggests that this will be a substantial minority. For the rest, the retirement system is failing us.
30 years ago, defined benefit (DB) plans were the bulwark of the corporate retirement system. After years of Congressional meddling, many employers consider DB plans to be impractical. At the same time with further emphasis on individual responsibility, the burden of providing a retirement benefit has been shifted largely to employees.
If you are good at Googling or Binging, you can easily find projections from lots of smart people showing that a good 401(k) plan will be sufficient for responsible employees to retire on. In my opinion, most of these projections are deficient. You just don't see projections that consider leakage including:
What do we learn from this? It's difficult to know for sure, but as is my wont on my blog, I'm going to take a shot at working it out.
Why are average account balances up? Well, the equity markets have performed pretty well over the last few years. Combine that with the fact that there has been time for additional contributions to those accounts and this makes sense. When we combine this, however, with my rationale for the prevalence of accounts decreasing, it may look troubling.
That the number of families with individual account retirement plans is decreasing suggests underlying issues with the economy. What I suspect is that many long-term unemployed or under-employed have had to liquidate accounts that they had a few years ago in order to survive. People laid off from jobs have taken distributions rather than rollovers to live on. I suspect that more often than not, these have been total distributions from smaller accounts. By eliminating some of the smaller account balances, the average and median accounts have grown in size.
That only about 50% of families have individual retirement accounts and only about 65% have any retirement plan at all is not good news for our future economy. How will the remaining 35% live? Moreover, among those 65%, will they have enough to survive in retirement?
The way it looks to me is that for people who are able to fully utilize their 401(k) or other retirement program for their entire working lifetimes, retirement may be comfortable. But this data suggests that this will be a substantial minority. For the rest, the retirement system is failing us.
30 years ago, defined benefit (DB) plans were the bulwark of the corporate retirement system. After years of Congressional meddling, many employers consider DB plans to be impractical. At the same time with further emphasis on individual responsibility, the burden of providing a retirement benefit has been shifted largely to employees.
If you are good at Googling or Binging, you can easily find projections from lots of smart people showing that a good 401(k) plan will be sufficient for responsible employees to retire on. In my opinion, most of these projections are deficient. You just don't see projections that consider leakage including:
- Unemployment for a meaningful period of time
- The necessity to take a job for a short or long time that does not have a savings plan
- Increased cost-shifting of all benefits to the employee which may reduce an employee's ability to save
- High-deductible health plans which force employees in many cases to pay significant amounts out-of-pocket for health care
This data is frightening. The retirement system is severely broken. Too many times, the public policy behind the retirement system has been abused by tax policy. We are left with retirement plans being a toy for Congress to make bills seemingly budget neutral.
The ability to retire is part of the 21st century American Dream. This data suggests that the retirement part of the dream may be just that -- a dream.
Not pretty ...
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Possible Delay of Pay Ratio Regulations -- Practical or Political?
Right before Thanksgiving, the House Committee on Financial Services sent a letter to the Chair of the SEC asking that guidance on the so-called Dodd-Frank Pay Ratio rule (Section 953(b)), and therefore implementation as well be delayed. The letter called this implementation a low priority. No similar correspondence has come from the Senate or any of its committees.
Gee, what a surprise that is. House committees are controlled by Republicans currently while Senate committees are in the hands of Democrats for few more weeks. Dodd-Frank was another bill and then law praised by Democrats and loathed by Republicans. The letter points out that the law does not specify a time by which the SEC must promulgate a rule on this issue. Additionally, the letter tells the SEC that the pay ratio disclosure has little value and that knowing the pay ratio for publicly traded companies back in the 2006-2008 timeframe would have done nothing to avert the financial crisis.
Let's regroup for a moment. For those who don't know, Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank law requires that registrants disclose a single number -- the ratio of the pay of the median-paid employee in the company to that of the CEO. Pay for this purpose is pay as defined in the executive compensation section of the proxy. I have argued that while such relative information may be useful to some that this calculation is the wrong one and needlessly burdensome. Last year, the SEC issued a proposed rule on the pay ratio calculation. While it provides a means of simplification for many companies, companies that do take advantage of the sampling techniques proposed will not find them simple by any means.
So, is the single number valuable? I don't think so. If one insists that such a comparison is valuable, then to me, it would be far more instructive to show CEO compensation and a chart of commonly held jobs within the company showing a compensation range for actual or hypothetical full-time employees(if no full-time actual employees exist for such job classifications) for each of those jobs alongside the CEO compensation.
Advocates of the pay ratio point out companies in the fast food industry. They note that CEOs make many millions of dollars while most fast food workers earn minimum wage or only slightly more. In this case, is the pay ratio valuable? To me, it's not. Running a multi-billion dollar business and defining its strategy to compete and grow has no similarities to monitoring a drive-thru window. Comparing the compensation of two such individuals makes no sense to me.
Currently, the SEC has three Democrats and two Republicans. The Chair is a Democrat. The commissioners still have meaningful Dodd-Frank work to do whether they make 953(b) a priority or not.
I don't know what they will do, but thus far, they have not shown a predisposition to act quickly on ensuring that the pay ratio is disclosed for registrants.
Gee, what a surprise that is. House committees are controlled by Republicans currently while Senate committees are in the hands of Democrats for few more weeks. Dodd-Frank was another bill and then law praised by Democrats and loathed by Republicans. The letter points out that the law does not specify a time by which the SEC must promulgate a rule on this issue. Additionally, the letter tells the SEC that the pay ratio disclosure has little value and that knowing the pay ratio for publicly traded companies back in the 2006-2008 timeframe would have done nothing to avert the financial crisis.
Let's regroup for a moment. For those who don't know, Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank law requires that registrants disclose a single number -- the ratio of the pay of the median-paid employee in the company to that of the CEO. Pay for this purpose is pay as defined in the executive compensation section of the proxy. I have argued that while such relative information may be useful to some that this calculation is the wrong one and needlessly burdensome. Last year, the SEC issued a proposed rule on the pay ratio calculation. While it provides a means of simplification for many companies, companies that do take advantage of the sampling techniques proposed will not find them simple by any means.
So, is the single number valuable? I don't think so. If one insists that such a comparison is valuable, then to me, it would be far more instructive to show CEO compensation and a chart of commonly held jobs within the company showing a compensation range for actual or hypothetical full-time employees(if no full-time actual employees exist for such job classifications) for each of those jobs alongside the CEO compensation.
Advocates of the pay ratio point out companies in the fast food industry. They note that CEOs make many millions of dollars while most fast food workers earn minimum wage or only slightly more. In this case, is the pay ratio valuable? To me, it's not. Running a multi-billion dollar business and defining its strategy to compete and grow has no similarities to monitoring a drive-thru window. Comparing the compensation of two such individuals makes no sense to me.
Currently, the SEC has three Democrats and two Republicans. The Chair is a Democrat. The commissioners still have meaningful Dodd-Frank work to do whether they make 953(b) a priority or not.
I don't know what they will do, but thus far, they have not shown a predisposition to act quickly on ensuring that the pay ratio is disclosed for registrants.
Monday, December 8, 2014
Multiemployer Pension Plan Crisis ... Or Not
Late last week, the New York Times published an article by Floyd Norris, its chief financial correspondent and an economist, on the crisis in multiemployer pension plans. I decided to write about it for a few reasons: 1) it's an interesting topic to me, 2) my strong impression is that the crisis is is not quite as the picture painted in the article, and 3) to go with the article, I think it's important to give some background and education.
I preface by saying that I do not generally work in the area of multiemployer plans, but then neither does Mr. Norris nor most of the people cited in his article.
Multiemployer (ME) pension plans are defined benefit (DB) plans. They meet the general tenet of DB plans in that they promise a benefit to plan participants at retirement rather than simply a pool of money segregated for that participant. But, there are lots of differences between ME plans and what most of us would think of as traditional (single employer) DB plans. Here are some of them.
I preface by saying that I do not generally work in the area of multiemployer plans, but then neither does Mr. Norris nor most of the people cited in his article.
Multiemployer (ME) pension plans are defined benefit (DB) plans. They meet the general tenet of DB plans in that they promise a benefit to plan participants at retirement rather than simply a pool of money segregated for that participant. But, there are lots of differences between ME plans and what most of us would think of as traditional (single employer) DB plans. Here are some of them.
- ME plans are collectively bargained.
- As the name suggests, these plans are generally maintained by more than one employer, usually in the same or related industries. The rationale is that a worker can be used by multiple businesses while all the time accruing a single pension.
- What is negotiated at the most basic level is the level of contributions that each employer will make. For example, a negotiated contribution might be 20 cents per hour worked or 25 cents per 1,000 miles driven.
- ME plans are managed, so to speak, by their trustees, joint committees having equal representation from labor unions and from management.
The article notes that the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the governmental agency that insures pension benefits, believes that it will run out of money in its ME fund in the very foreseeable future. This could be the case (I have no reason to doubt the PBGC's forecasts) as two of the largest plans (those of the United Mine Workers and Central States Teamsters) are nearing the point where they will have insufficient assets to pay benefits to retirees.
What the article does not point out, however, is that the large majority of ME plans are really pretty well funded. Generally, ME plans have been managed responsibly and as a result, most of those plans do not face similar dangers.
When the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was signed into law in 1974, ME plans were not even covered by the PBGC. It wasn't until 1980 when the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MEPPAA) became law that such a fund was established for ME plans. And, even then, it was thought (I don't know any of the logic which may have been very good at the time for these thoughts) that the likelihood of ME plans needing PBGC coverage was small. So, as PBGC premiums for single-employer plans continued to increase, premiums for ME plans stayed low.
From my viewpoint, the reason for this might have been that it is up to the plan trustees to assure that the level of benefits provided to ME plan participants not be such that plan assets would be insufficient to pay such benefits. However, I have heard it said by people working in the ME arena, that in some of the larger, less funded plans that the strategy used amounted to a death spiral which is now approaching that death.
What happened?
As we know, plan assets have some years where their underlying investments perform well and some where they don't. So, when assets did perform well, and this is oversimplified a bit, the plans appeared to be better funded than they had been and therefore able to support higher levels of benefits for plan participants. In some plans, the trustees granted such increases. But, we all know that not all years provide excellent investment returns. When the plans were suddenly less well funded, benefit levels did not decrease. Further, and the United Mine Workers represent a good case study for this, when the ratio of active workers to retired participants decreases (similar to the US Social Security system), sources of assets may no longer be sufficient to support benefits. [This is a great reason to fully fund benefits for an individual participant on a reasonable actuarial basis by the time that participant leaves employment, but that's for another rant.]
What Mr. Norris does not point out in his article is that most ME plans are not in danger of needing PBGC protection. And, for the two plans in question, one might posit that they dug their own graves, so to speak. That is, they offered levels of benefits that the plans were not able to sustain over the long haul. Some ME actuaries have told me that the trustees who engage them for valuation services and for consulting advice have not necessarily followed that advice.
The losers in this story are likely the people who have done nothing wrong. Plan participants, as a group, tend to do their jobs and assume that that their pensions will be paid. It is not the fault of a coal miner in the UMW plan that the industry fell on hard times. And, that long haul trucker in the Central States plan probably has no idea how his pension plan works, but he does expect that when he retires that he will get the benefits that he has been guaranteed.
A joint business and labor group developed a plan designed to rescue the ME system without bailouts and without saving the PBGC. It was controversial in that it violated one of the most sacred tenets of ERISA -- thou shalt not reduce benefits that have already been earned. However, for any plans that go under, benefits in excess of the PBGC maximum guaranteed benefit may be reduced. And, if the PBGC runs out of money, even benefits less than that limit will likely be reduced.
The situation is more complex than I describe. ME rules are quite complicated. But, I reiterate that the crisis appears to be limited to a relatively small percentage of plans, and according to the joint business and labor group could be solved by reducing benefits only in those plans that promised benefits that it could never have expected to support for the long term. Anything like that, however, would require Congress to pass a bill and the President to sign it.
Oh well ...
Friday, December 5, 2014
On Surveys, Data, and Other Common Misconceptions
Every so often, I feel the need to talk about things that are wrong. Well, perhaps I do that more than every so often, but I do it to varying degrees. Here I am going to focus mostly on surveys and their data. I'm not going to cite anything in particular, though, so you'll just have to trust me that I am not making it up.
I have seen the data from lots of surveys that purport to tell us what are the most important elements to making a job desirable. I have read all sorts of things about mentoring, how green the workplace is, whether the health benefits are good, and the amount of focus put on learning and development among other things. These are all very important, but ...
When someone leaves a job voluntarily, ask them why they left. I have very rarely heard someone say they are leaving to go elsewhere because the new company has a great mentoring program, they are a green company, the health benefits are better, or the focus is on learning and development. Far more often, I have heard one of these:
I have seen the data from lots of surveys that purport to tell us what are the most important elements to making a job desirable. I have read all sorts of things about mentoring, how green the workplace is, whether the health benefits are good, and the amount of focus put on learning and development among other things. These are all very important, but ...
When someone leaves a job voluntarily, ask them why they left. I have very rarely heard someone say they are leaving to go elsewhere because the new company has a great mentoring program, they are a green company, the health benefits are better, or the focus is on learning and development. Far more often, I have heard one of these:
- I got a big pay raise
- I hated my boss and I had to get away
- I hated my job and or the company I was working for
- I was in a dead end job
- I don't have to travel as much
- I get to travel more
What this tells me is that something about the surveys is just wrong. And, I don't think it is the inability of the people who report the results to accurately compile or report the data. I think it falls under GIGO.
GIGO, you say? What is that?
Garbage in, garbage out!
Surveys as a group, are horribly constructed. Correction, it would be an improvement on most surveys if they were horribly constructed. Most are worse than that.
If we consider job/pay/benefits related surveys, what would you think of a question like this: "How important to you are your health benefits?" Well, of course, they are very important.
So, since everyone says they are important, this gets construed as being one of the keys to hiring and keeping good employees. But, you rarely hear about employees choosing a particular employer or failing to because of the particular health benefits. The question has always been whether they offer health benefits. Very few people ask specifically what they are, how much they will pay for them, or what is included or excluded.
We could say similar things about retirement benefits. You need to have a 401(k) plan to compete. But, if it's a bad plan, nobody ever leaves specifically because of that. Yet, if you were to read survey data and reports, you would think that the quality of a 401(k) plan was a top 3 attraction and retention tool. I will say, however, that employees will think twice before leaving a company with a great retirement program, especially if they have a defined benefit pension plan. It is a retention tool and it is a differentiator.
We could say similar things about retirement benefits. You need to have a 401(k) plan to compete. But, if it's a bad plan, nobody ever leaves specifically because of that. Yet, if you were to read survey data and reports, you would think that the quality of a 401(k) plan was a top 3 attraction and retention tool. I will say, however, that employees will think twice before leaving a company with a great retirement program, especially if they have a defined benefit pension plan. It is a retention tool and it is a differentiator.
Okay, rant over for the day.
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