Fixing Retirement Inequality

Just last week, I suggested that retirement inequality is nearing an apocalypse. It's an awfully strong statement to make as both the US and the world have plenty of problems to deal with. Since this one is US-centric (I have nowhere near sufficient expertise nor do I have the requisite data to offer an informed opinion outside the US), I thought I would step up and make some suggestions.

First, the problem: according to the most optimistic data points I have seen, somewhere between 60 and 70 percent of working Americans are "on track" to retire. And, these studies, when they are nice enough to disclose their assumptions use pretty aggressive assumptions, e.g., 7 to 8 percent annual returns on assets (the same people who tout that these are achievable condemn pension plans that make the same assumptions) as well as no leakage (the adverse effects of job loss, plan loans, hardship withdrawals, and deferral or match reductions). The optimists don't make it easy for you by telling you that even their optimistic studies result in 30 to 40 percent of working Americans not being on track to retire (a horrible result). They also tend to pick and choose data to suit their arguments using means when they are advantageous, but medians when they are more so.

Yes, we do have a retirement crisis and as the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) study was good enough to make clear, it is severely biased against the average worker.

The EPI study presented data on account balances and similar issues. It did not get into interviewing actual workers (if it did, I missed that part and apologize to EPI). But, I did. I surveyed 25 people at random in the airline club at the largest hub airport of a major US-based airline. People who wait in those clubs at rush hour are not your typical American worker; they tend to be far better off. I asked them two questions (the second only if they answered yes to the first):

• Are you worried about being able to retire some day? 19 answered yes.
• Would you be more productive at work if you felt that you could retire comfortably? All 19 who answered yes to the first question answered yes to the second as well.

While I didn't ask further questions, many groused about fear of outliving their wealth. Some talked about issues that fall under leakage. A few, completely unprompted remarked that if they only had a pension ...

For at least the last 13 years and probably more than that, retirement policy inside the Beltway has been focused on improving 401(k) plans with the thought that pensions are or should be dead. Even the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) was more about making 401(k)s more attractive than about protecting pensions. Yet, 13 years later with an entire decade of booming equity markets, even the optimists say that one-third of American workers are not on track to retire.

We've given every break that Congress can come up with to make 401(k)s the be all and end all of US retirement policy. They've not succeeded. 

Think back though to when the cornerstone of the US retirement system was the pension plan. The people who had them are often the ones who are on track to retire. 

Yes, I know all the arguments against them and here are a few:

• Workers don't spend their careers at one company, so they need something account-based and or portable.
• Companies can't stand volatility in accounting charges and in cash contribution requirements.
• Nobody understands them.
• They are difficult to administer.

PPA took a step toward solving all of those problems, but by the time we had regulations to interpret those changes, the "Great Recession" had happened and the world had already changed. Despite now having new pension designs available that address not just one, but all four of the bullet points above, companies have been slow to adopt these solutions. To do so, they need perhaps as many as three pushes:

• A cry from employees that they want a modern pension in order to provide them with usable lifetime income solutions.
• A recognition from Congress and from the regulating agencies that such plans will be inherently appropriately funded and therefore (so long as companies do make required contributions on a timely basis) do not pose undue risk to companies, to the government, to employees, or to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) (the governmental corporation that insures corporate pensions) and therefore should be encouraged not discouraged.
• Recognition from the accounting profession in the form of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) that plans that have an appropriate match between benefit obligations and plan assets do not need to be subjected to volatile swings in profit and loss.

Give us those three things and the pensions sanctioned by the Pension Protection Act can fix retirement for the future. As the EPI study points out, we'll make a huge dent in the retirement crisis and we'll do in a way that makes the problem far less unequal.

It's the right thing to do. It's right for all working Americans.

If Income Inequality is a Crisis, Retirement Inequality is Nearing an Apocalypse

I've likely inflamed just with my title. So be it.

The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) earlier this week released an article by Monique Morrissey on the State of American Retirement Savings. It's subtitle is "How the shift to 401(k)s has increased gaps in retirement preparedness based on income, race, ethnicity, education, and marital status." It is stunning.

I've been saying for at least this decade that we have a retirement crisis. Despite protestations from those who favor self-sufficiency over employer and government-provided programs, the crisis looms larger. I wrote about this summer. But, as a full-time consultant working with clients who require that I place their needs first, I simply don't have time to do the research that the think tanks do. So, I often rely on the work that they have done. Regardless of the source, my considered opinion is that all of the data are sound whether the think tanks are right-leaning, left-leaning, or centrist. 

What I quibble with are the conclusions. 

More than half of Americans being on track to retire is not a favorable prognosis. It's especially not favorable when the modeling underlying that statement assumes constant, and perhaps unachievable, returns on investments and constant rates of deferral to 401(k) plans. We're asking a populace that is largely under-educated about financial and investment matters to instantly become great investors. We're also asking them to save for their retirement (including retiree health and long-term care) above all else -- no blips allowed. You lose your job? Keep saving. You pay for a child's wedding? Keep saving. You pay for an unexpected medical expense? Keep saving.

Is that practical? Of course it's not.

The EPI study has presented us with 20 charts. Each has a headline which, in my opinion (understanding that yours may be different) fairly depicts the data it shows. Here are a few of the more eye-catching ones (indented notes after the headlines are mine and should not be attributed to or blamed on EPI)::

• Retirement plan participation declined even as baby boomers approached retirement
• A smaller percentage of workers are now participating in employer-sponsored retirement plans than were 10 years ago. With the rise of the gig economy, this rates to get worse.
• The share of families with retirement savings grew in the 1990s but declined after the Great Recession
• Fewer than 60% have retirement savings. Period. How are the rest to ever retire?
• Retirement savings have stagnated in the new millennium
• Despite that savings of those above the age of 55 have increased fairly dramatically, those for the entire working population have barely moved suggesting that the runup in equity markets over the last decade has done little for most of America.
• Most families—even those approaching retirement—have little or no retirement savings
• This is frightening. In any age range, median (meaning half are better off and half are worse off) retirement savings are well beneath $50,000 ... in total.
• More people have 401(k)s, but participation in traditional pensions is more equal
• We'll return to this later, but this suggests that poorer people and minorities are less likely to make use of 401(k)s. Identifying the root cause is a highly charged issue and cannot be done with certainty, but identifying this as a sign of a problem is clear.
• High-income families are seven times as likely to have retirement account savings as low-income families
• Most black and Hispanic families have no retirement account savings
• Single people have less, but retirement savings are too low across the board
• The data show that single women, in particular, lack retirement savings. But, even among married couples, levels of retirement savings are abysmal.
• 401(k)s magnify inequality
• Those out of the top 20% when stratified by income represent a disproportionately low level of savings account balances.

I said I would return to the statement that participation in traditional pensions is more equal. It seems clear that this is because in most cases, an employee becomes a participant in a pension not through an affirmative decision to do so, but as part of his or her employment. It doesn't require an income disruption. It's not more difficult to participate when you have an unexpected expense.It's not easier for the wealthy to participate, nor for men nor ethnic or racial majorities. 

Yes, pensions have a horrible stigma attached to them right now. Many public pensions are horrifically underfunded and potentially place their sponsors (cities, states, etc.) in grave financial danger. The same could be said about some of what are known as multiemployer plans (that's a story for another day) except that their sponsors are, generally speaking, employers that employ very specific types of employees. 

For the rest of the populace and potential plan sponsors (employers), sponsorship of traditional pensions has waned considerably. About 18 months ago, I explained why. 

Before we write them off completely, however, let's look at what pensions do. According to the EPI study, participation is somewhat equal. They provide lifetime income protection, the single greatest fear of people nearing retirement. They can be part of the employment covenant.

And, thanks to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, they need not bring with them the cost volatility that has maddened CFOs across the country.

The data in the EPI study and not simply their interpretations absolutely scream that more than income inequality, retirement inequality is the looming personal financial crisis. Congress will bat this around and try to make it a partisan issue. But, it shouldn't be. It's a people crisis. It's a dire crisis. It needs a fix and the fix is available, but it needs to get started.

Do We Have A Retirement Crisis? Of Course We Do.

Do we have retirement crisis in the US? Showing my age and with apologies to Messrs. Rowan and Martin, you bet your sweet bippy we do. Despite all the pundits citing data and telling us that we don't have that problem, I'm telling you we do.

I was inspired to write this by an excellent piece that I read in Investment News this morning. The theme was that Vanguard's data shows that the average combined savings rate (employee plus employer) has increased since 2004 from 10.4% of pay to 10.6% of pay. To understand this better, let's look at what else has happened during this period.

The Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 became law. Many defined benefit (DB) pension plans were frozen and or terminated. The new in vogue terms in the 401(k) world all suddenly started with auto: auto-enrollment, auto-escalation, auto-pilot. At the same time, the new fear became that of outliving your savings.

That's right, people are living longer. People know that people are living longer. This frightens many. From a retirement perspective, they don't know how to deal with this. So, the old normal (2019) cannot continue to be the new normal (beyond 2019).

Why do I say that? What's wrong with the analysis from pundits?

Suppose I told you that 55% of Americans are "on track to retire," whatever that means (every recordkeeping firm who puts out data like that has their own basis for what that does mean). Is that good news or bad news? Most who think that the 401(k)-only system is as close to nirvana as one can get would tell you it's great news. They say so on social media. They go out of their way to bash those who disagree.

Well, I disagree and here is why. I'm going to reword what they are saying taking what they say as factual. Suppose I told you that 45% of Americans are not on track to retire. How would you react to that? My intuition says that you would think that is a horrible thing. Yet, it is exactly the same thing as 55% of Americans being on track to retire.

Further, the data being used often assumes that Americans will take their 401(k) balances and draw them down ratably and prudently. Which Americans are those? They're not the Americans of 2019. They're not the ones who want the latest gadget. They're not the ones that love their Amazon Prime accounts. They're not the ones from the instant gratification world of today.

For most Americans, being able to guarantee a level of lifetime income protection is of nearly paramount importance. It's not easy in a 401(k) world. In-plan annuity options are rare and expensive. Taking a distribution to buy an annuity is even more expensive and requires an education in an industry that few Americans have access to.

Look at the generation that retired over the 25 years or so from roughly 1980 to 2005. They often have lifetime income. They may also have account-based savings. They, because they did not live in a 401(k)-only world, were able to get it right.

DB plans of the past had problems. Smart people designed better solutions, but the really [not so] smart people conspired to make us think that 401(k) only is the best solution.

It's time to visit those better solutions.

• Cost stability and predictable cost for plan sponsors.
• Lifetime income availability at actuarially fair prices for participants.
• Account growth through professionally managed assets, but with a guaranteed return of principal.
• The ability to take your account with you.

And, you can still have your 401(k) on the side to supplement it.

Doesn't this feel closer to nirvana. Isn't this a way to truly move the needle and get us out of the retirement crisis?

4 Problems at the Intersection of Finance and HR

They are two of the most visible departments in corporations even though neither directly produces revenue, but does require expenditures -- Finance and HR. Historically, they have been at odds neither particularly caring about the worries of the other despite being inextricably linked. This occurs in many ways, but I'm going to focus on four in the order that they seem to arise:

1. Recruiting
2. Cost control and stability
3. Retention
4. Workforce transition

Of course there are many more, but I have some thoughts that link all four of these together. In 2019, that's not always easy as there are constant pushes in Congress to tell employers how much they must pay, which benefits they must provide, and at what costs. How then does one company differentiate itself from another?

To the extent possible, every employer today seems to offer teleworking, flexible work hours, and paid time off banks. While they once were, those are no longer differentiators. After the Affordable Care Act took effect, the health plans at Company X started to look a lot like the health plans at Company Y.

I have a different idea and while I am probably biased by my consulting focus, I am also biased by research that I read. Employees are worried about retiring someday. They are worried about whether they will have enough money or even if they have any way of knowing if they will have enough money. They are worried about outliving their wealth (or lack thereof). They are worried about having the means to support their health in retirement.

I know -- you think I have veered horribly from my original thesis. We're coming back.

Today, most good-sized companies have 401(k) plans and in an awful lot of those cases, they are safe harbor plans. They are an expectation, so having one does not help you the employer in recruiting. While once they had pizzazz, today they are routine. 

Cost stability seems a given, but it's not. Common benchmarks for the success of a 401(k) plan including the percentage of employees that participate at various levels. You score better if your employees do participate and at higher levels. But, that costs more money.

If there's nothing about that program that sets you apart, it doesn't help you to retain your employees. And, as we all have learned, the cost of unwanted turnover is massive often exceeding a year's salary. In other words, if you lose a desirable employee earning $100,000 per year, it is estimated that the total true cost of replacing her is about $100,000. That would have paid for a lot of years of retirement plan costs for her.

There will come a time, however, that our desirable employee thinks it's time to retire. But, she's not certain if she is able. And, even if she works out that she is able, retirement is so sudden. One day, she's getting up and working all nine to five and the next, she has to fill that void. Wouldn't it be great to be able to transition her into retirement gradually while she transitions her skills and knowledge to her replacement?

You need a differentiator. You need something different, exciting, and better. You need to be the kid on the block that everyone else envies. 

You would be the envy of all the others if you won at recruiting, kept your costs level (as a percentage of payroll) and on budget, retained key employees, and had a vehicle that allows for that smooth transition.

I had a conversation with a key hiring executive earlier this month. He said he cannot get mid-career people to come to his organization from [and he mentioned another peer organization]. He was exasperated. He said, "We're better and everyone knows it, but their best people won't come over." I asked him why. He said, "It's that pension and I can't get one put in here." I asked him to tell me more and he explained it as one of those new-fangled cash balance plans with guaranteed return of principal -- i.e., no investment risk for participants, professionally managed assets, the ability to receive 401(k) rollovers, and the option to take a lump sum or various annuity options at retirement. He said that it's the "talk of the town over there" and that even though it seems mundane when you first hear about it, it's their differentiator and it wins for them.

We talked for a while. He wants one. He wants one for himself and he wants one to be as special as his competitor. He wants to be envied too. We talked more.

Stay tuned for their new market-based cash balance plan ... maybe. He and I hope that maybe becomes reality.

Eliminating the Phone-A-Friend Retirement Plan

I read an article earlier this morning informing me that employees don't really understand 401(k) plans. News Flash: that's not news. In fact, looking at behavior of employees and overhearing casual conversations between otherwise intelligent 401(k) participants about the value of their 401 plans, their 201k (when they are underperforming expectations), their 501k (when they are overperforming expectations), and the ways that they choose investment options, this sounds like a statement from Captain Obvious.

How did 401(k) plans get this way? In their earlier incarnations, typical 401(k) plans gave employees an option to defer. In most plans, employees that did choose to defer got a match from their employers. Employees could then invest those assets within the plan in usually about five to eight options.

I recall a conversation back in the early 1990s with an individual who is now on every list of the great minds of the 401(k) world and the great innovators in the 401(k) world. This individual told me that no defined contribution plan needs more than six investment options ... ever .. and that any plan sponsor with more than six should be lined up with their adviser before a firing squad (the words are not precise, so no quotation marks, but they are pretty darned close). The same individual later became one of the leading proponents of a 'full menu' of options with at least one and often more than one from each asset class and each investment style within that asset class.

How exactly do employees benefit from such choices? They don't.

Suppose I choose three highly rated large cap funds from US News's report:

• T Rowe Price Institutional Large Cap Core Growth Fund
• Fidelity Blue Chip Growth Fund
• JP Morgan Intrepid Growth Fund

Let's imagine that they are all in my fund's lineup. How do I choose?

Intrepid sounds like a cool name. Maybe I should pick that. Blue Chip? My grandfather told me to invest in blue chips. I wonder if that's still true today. And, that long name? If it does all those things, it must be really good, too.

I could read the prospectuses. I could do research on performance history. I could look at investment styles and drift whatever all that means. I could phone a friend.

The simple fact is that for most of us, it's a crap shoot ... plain and simple. 

Because of that, despite all the forecasts in the world from 401(k) lovers, this should not ever be a primary plan for employees. As it was intended back in the late 70s and early 80s, this should be a supplemental savings plan -- an addition to what you get in your primary plan.

Your primary plan should be just that. It should be employer-provided. It should not be confusing. There should be no need for a phone a friend option. 

I don't care what kind it is although I have my biases. My bias is that the plan should provide for the ability for participants to take distributions in lump sums or wholesale-priced annuities (my term for annuities on a fair actuarial basis without middle men making profits at your expense). My bias is that the determination of your benefits in the plan should be simple. My bias is that assets should be professionally managed. 

I don't care what label you give to such a plan. I don't even care what label ERISA or the Internal Revenue Code gives to such a plan. What I do care about is that you not lose sleep over whether Intrepid is better than Blue Chip or conversely. What I do care about is that if you choose to annuitize your account balance that you get an annuity that is 100% of what you deserve not some number closer to 80%. 

And, for your supplemental savings, you can have your Phone-A-Friend ... oops, I meant 401(k) plan.

Time to Revisit the Work Relationship

I read an article the other day highlighting some findings from a Willis Towers Watson survey. Quoting from the article:

Yet only 25% rank contributing to a health savings account (HSA) as a top current financial priority, falling below saving for retirement in a 401(k), paying for essential day-to-day expenses and paying off debt. The survey found the majority of employees (69%) who didn't enroll in an HSA said they chose not to because they didn't see the benefit, understand HSAs, or take the time to understand them.

Let's think about the hidden part of what is being said there. The relationship between employers and employees has changed. As two factions battle for dominance in what that relationship should look like -- those who preach self-reliance think that employers should provide availability of savings options only and those who preach mandated pay and benefits think that the only differentiators should be things like office gyms and juice bars -- we are left in a world where creativity is encouraged, but not in any determination of how employees are rewarded.

If you were to take a survey of which benefits employees find the most important (many have, but I can't put my hands on one right now), I suspect that numbers one and two would be their health benefits and their 401(k). Why? The data that I cite above shows that most don't understand their health benefits and having worked in the retirement space for more than half my life, I can tell you that the large majority don't understand their 401(k) either. Many understand what it is, but relatively few understand what it's not.

So much for the people who preach self-reliance as in 2018, those are two benefit types that are the epitome of self-reliance.

Let's turn for a moment to another side of the equation -- pay. The other side of the spectrum would have us believe that as an employer, you are not particularly entitled to differentiate between employees based on much of anything because if the data suggests that any two employees are paid any differently from each other and it is even remotely possible that maybe someone in their wildest dreams could divine that those differences in pay are based on something that the law doesn't or shouldn't, in their opinion, allow, the company is in trouble.

Suppose we were to scrap the current system. Suppose different companies offered different benefits that their employees could understand. Suppose they paid employees based on the value they brought to those companies (yes, I know that value is nigh impossible to measure).

In the thought to be antiquated employer-employee relationship that existed 30-35 years ago, consider what we had:

• Companies were generally nicely profitable;
• Employees tended to stay with the companies that they worked for at age 35 until they retired;
• Those employees, generally speaking, lived as well as or better in retirement than they did while they were working;
• Health benefits were such that employees didn't go into debt to pay their share of them from every paychecks; and 
• Neither the country nor its citizens were reeling in debt.

I also see data that tells me that more than half (usually about 55%) are on track to retire. Translated, that means that nearly half are woefully behind. That's not a success. That is an utter failure.

The experiments of employee self-reliance and of paying everyone the same because you're not allowed to pay them differently have been failures. More likely than not, they will remain failures. 

Perhaps it's time to see what was right about the employer-employee relationship in the 80s and bring it back. Let's aim for 100% of employees being on track to retire. Let's aim for benefits that employees use because they do understand them. Let's pay people that deliver value in the workplace. It is time to revisit the work relationship.

Are You Better Off than You Were 20 Years Ago?

Nearly 40 years ago, Ronald Reagan asked voters if they were better off than they were four years earlier. And, that was the beginning of the end for Jimmy Carter's reelection hopes. So, without trying to end anything for you, I ask if you are better off from a retirement standpoint than you were 20 years ago.

For Americans as a group, I think the answer is a clear no. Our retirement system has been broken by the momentum that has gathered around the 401(k) plan. After all, when Section 401(k) was added to the Internal Revenue Code in the Revenue Act of 1978, it was never intended to be a primary retirement vehicle. In fact, it was a throw in that even among those who were there, there doesn't seem to be much agreement on why it was thrown into the Act.

When it was, however, defined benefit (DB) pension plans were in their heyday. People who were fortunate enough to be in those plans then are now retired and an awful lot of them are living very well in retirement. On the other hand, people who are now retiring having been in 401(k) plans only have their retirement fates scattered all over the place. Some are very well off, bit others are essentially living off of Social Security.

Let's consider where those people went wrong. For many, when they first had the opportunity to defer, they chose not to. They had bills to pay and they just couldn't make ends meet if they didn't take that current income. By the time they realized that they should have been saving all along, they couldn't catch up.

For others, they were doing well until they lost a job. Where could they get current income? They took a 401(k) distribution.

Yes, I am very well aware that the models show that people who are auto-enrolled and auto-escalated in a 401(k) plan with a safe harbor match will fare quite well. Those models all assume no disruptions and constant returns on account balances of usually around 7%.

Let's return to reality. The reality is that young workers are (likely because of all the campaigns telling them to do so) deferring liberally when they start in the workforce. The problem is, and I get this anecdotally from young workers, that more of them than not reach a point where they just can't defer at those levels any more. They get married, buy a house, and have kids, and the financial equation doesn't work. So, they cut back on deferrals. I know a number who have gutted one or more of their 401(k) plans in order to buy a house. The fact is that it's not easy to defer, for example, 10% of your pay into your 401(k), another 5% into your health savings account (HSA), and save money for a down payment on a house.

Where were we 20 years ago? For many Americans, they were about to be getting those notices that their DB plans were getting frozen. Congress killed those DB plans. The FASB killed those DB plans.

When I got into this business in 1985, most (not all) corporate pension plans were being funded responsibly. And, this status was helped, albeit for only a year or two by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (shortening amortization periods). One of the big keys, and this will be understood largely by actuaries, is that we had choices of actuarial cost methods. My favorite then and it would be now as well for traditional DB plans is known as the entry age normal (EAN) method. The reason for this is that under EAN, the current (or normal) cost of a plan was either a level cost per participant (for non pay-related plans) or a level percentage of payroll for pay-related plans. Put yourself in the position of a CFO -- that makes it really easy to budget for.

But Congress and the FASB knew better. In the Pension Protection Act of 1987 (often referred to OBRA 87 because it was one title of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), we had it imposed on us that we must perform a Unit Credit (another actuarial cost method) valuation for all DB plans. And, in doing that Unit Credit (UC) valuation, we were given prescribed discount rates. At about the same time (most companies adopted what was then called FAS 87 and is now part of ASC 715), DB plan sponsors also had to start doing a separate accounting valuation using the Projected Unit Credit (PUC)  (Unit Credit for non-pay related plans) actuarial cost method. Most of those sponsors found that their fees would be less if they just used these various unit credit methods for their regular valuations as well and we were off and running ... in the wrong direction.

You see, PUC generally produced lower funding requirements than EAN and the arbitrary limits on funding put in place by that second funding regime known as current liability (the UC valuation) and most DB plans had what is known as a $0 full funding limit. In other words, they could not make deductible contributions to their DB plans during much of the 1990s. And, it stayed that way until prescribed discount rates plummeted and there were a few years of investment losses.

What happened then?

CFOs balked. They had gotten used to running these plans for free. Suddenly they had to contribute to them and because the funding rules were entirely broken, the amounts that they had to contribute were volatile and unpredictable. That's a bad combination.

So, one after another, sponsors began to freeze those DB plans. And, they did it at just the time that their workers could least afford it.

For all the data and models that tell us that it should be otherwise, more people than ever before are working into their 70s, generally, in my opinion, because they have to, not because they want to. As a population, we're not better off in this regard than we were 20 years ago In fact we are far worse off.

Even for those people who did accumulate large account balances, many of them don't know how to handle that money in retirement and they don't have longevity protection.

We need a fresh start. We need funding rules that makes sense and we need a plan of the future. It shouldn't be that difficult. I'd like to think that my actuarial brethren are smart people and that they can design that cadre of plans. They'll be understandable, they'll be portable as people change jobs, they'll have lump sum options and annuity options , and they'll even have longevity insurance. They'll allow participants the ability to combine all those in, for example, taking 30% of their benefit as a lump sum, using 55% for an annuity from the plan beginning at retirement, and 15% to "buy" cost-of-living protection from the plan.

That's great, isn't it? Even most of the 535 people in Congress would probably tell you that it is.

But those same 535 people don't really understand a lick about DB plans or generally about retirement plans (there are a few exceptions, but very few). In order to get that fresh start, we need laws that will allow those designs to work.

We surely don't have them now.

Over the years, Congress has punished the many plan sponsors because of a few bad actors. If 95% of DB plans were being funded responsibly, then Congress changed the funding rules for 100% of plans to be more punitive because of the other 5%.

Isn't it time to go back to the future to get this all fixed?

Let's kill the 401(k) as a primary retirement plan and develop the plan of the future. It could be here much sooner than you think.

Wake Up and See the Light, Congress!

Congress has a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Since its first major overhaul in 1922, Congress has seen fir to make earth-shaking changes to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) once every 32 years. 1922. 1954. 1986. And, while it seems that they may be one year early this time, they are pitching tax reform once again.

The concept of qualified retirement plans as we know them today comes from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) signed into law that Labor Day in 1974. Since that time, there have been relatively few changes to the Code affecting retirement plan design. And, frankly, most of them have come on the 401(k) side. In fact, Section 401(k) was added to the Code after ERISA and since then, we have been blessed with safe harbor plans, auto-enrollment, auto-escalation,Roth, and qualified default investment alternatives (QDIAs). Over the same period, little has been codified or regulated to help in propagating the defined benefit plan -- you know, that plan design that has helped many born in the 40s and early 50s to retire comfortably.

Isn't this the time? Surely, it can be done with little, if any, effective revenue effects.

Since ERISA, there have been really significant changes in defined benefit (DB) plan design including the now popular traditional cash balance plan, the even better market return cash balance plan, pension equity plan, and less used other hybrid plans. And, DB plans have lots of features that should make them more popular than DC plans, especially 401(k) plans.

• Participants can get annuity payouts directly from the plan, thereby paying wholesale rather than the retail prices they would pay from insurers for a DC account balance.
• Participants who prefer a lump sum can take one and if they choose, roll that amount over to an IRA.
• Assets are professionally invested and since employers have more leverage than do individuals, the invested management fees are better negotiated.
• In the event of corporate insolvency, the benefits are secure up to limits.
• Plan assets are invested by the plan sponsor so that participants don't have to focus on investment decisions for which they are woefully under-prepared.
• Participants don't have to contribute in order to benefit.

But, they could be better. Isn't it time that we allowed benefits to be taken in a mixed format, e.g., 50% lump sum, 25% immediate annuity, 25% annuity deferred to age 85? Isn't it time that these benefits should be as portable as participants might like? Isn't it time to get rid of some of the absolutely foolish administrative burdens put on plan sponsors by Congress -- those burdens that Congress thought would make DB plans more understandable, but actually just create more paperwork, more plan freezes, and more plan terminations?

Thus far, however, Congress seems to be missing this golden opportunity. And, in doing so, Congress cites the praise of the 401(k) system by people whose modeling never considers that many who are eligible for 401(k) plans just don't have the means to defer enough to make those models relevant to their situations.

Sadly, Congress prefers to keep its collective blinders on rather than waking up and seeing the light. Shame on them ...

Instead of Making Defined Contribution Look More Like Defined Benefit, ...

I don't think I've ever ended the title of a blog post with an ellipsis before. But, surely, there's a first time for everything.

Lately, the benefits press has written an awful lot about what must be the latest trend in employer-provided retirement benefits -- making the defined contribution (DC) plan look more like the defined benefit (DB) plan. Perhaps I am missing something, but it appears that this "major" initiative has two components to it (that's right, just two):

• Communication of an estimate of the amount of annuity a participant's account balance can buy
• The option to take a distribution from the plan as either a series of installments or as an annuity

Let's consider what's going on here.

Annuity Estimate

Yes, there is a huge push from the government and from some employers to communicate the annual benefit that can be "bought" with the participant's account balance. Most commonly, this is framed as a single life annuity beginning at age 65 using a dreamworld set of actuarial assumptions. For example, it might assume a discount rate in the range of 5 to 7 percent because that's the rate of return that the recordkeeper or other decision maker thinks or wants the participant to think the participant can get.

I have a challenge for those people. Go to the open annuity market. Find me some annuities from safe providers that have an underlying discount rate of 5 to 7 percent. You did say that you wanted a challenge, didn't you?

I'm taking a wild (perhaps not so wild) guess that in late 2016, you couldn't find those annuities. In fact, an insurer in business to make money (that is why they're in business, isn't it) would be crazy today to offer annuities with an implicit discount rate in that range.

But, annuity estimates often continue to use discount rates like that.

Distribution Options

Many DC plans offer distribution in a series of installments. Participants rarely take them, however, For most participants, the default behaviors are either 1) taking a lump sum distribution and rolling it over, or 2) taking a lump sum distribution and buying a proverbial (or not so proverbial) bass boat.

Why is this? I think it's a behavioral question. But, when retiring participants look at the amount that they can draw down from their account balances, it's just not as much as they had hoped. In fact, there is a tendency to suddenly wonder how they can possibly live on such a small amount. So, they might take a lump sum and spend it as needed and then hope something good will happen eventually.

Similarly, if they have the option of getting an annuity from the plan, they are typically amazed at how small that annuity payout is. And, even with the uptick in the number of DC plans offering annuity options, the take rate remains inconsequentially small.

A Better Way?

Isn't there a better way? 

Part of the switch from DB plans to DC plans was predicated on the concept of employees get it. They understand an account balance, but they can't get their arms around a deferred annuity. So, let's give them an account balance.

Part of the switch from DB to DC plans was to be able to capture the potential investment returns. Of course, with that upside potential comes downside risk. Let's give them most of that upside potential and let's take away the worst of that downside risk. That sounds great, doesn't it.

Once these participants got into their DC plans, they wanted investment options. I recall back in the late 80s and early 90s that a plan with as many as 8 investment options was viewed as having too many. Now, many plans have 25 or more such options. For what? The average participant isn't a knowledgeable investor. And, even the miraculous invention commonly known as robo-advice isn't going to make them one. Suppose we give them that upside potential with professionally managed assets that they don't have to choose.

Oh, that's available in many DC plans. They call them managed accounts. According to a Forbes article, management fees of 15 to 70 basis points on top of the fund fees are common. That can be a lot of expense. Suppose your account was part of a managed account with hundreds of millions or billions of dollars in it, therefore making it eligible for deeply discounted pricing.

There is a Better Way

You can give your participants all of this. It seems hard to believe, but it's been a little more than 10 years since Congress passed and President George W Bush signed the Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006. PPA was lauded for various changes made to 401(k) structures. These changes were going to make retirement plans great again. But, for most, they didn't.

Also buried in that bill was a not new, but previously legally uncertain concept now known as a market-return cash balance plan (MRCB). 

Remember all those concepts that I asked for in the last section, the MRCB has them all. Remember the annuity option that participants wanted, but didn't like because insurance company profits made the benefits too low. Well, the MRCB doesn't need to turn a profit. And, for the participants who prefer a lump sum, it would be an exceptionally rare (I am not aware of any) MRCB that doesn't have a lump sum option.

Plan Sponsor Financial Implications

Plan sponsors wanted out of the DB business largely because their costs were unpredictable. But, in an MRCB, properly designed, costs should be easy to budget for and within very tight margins. In fact, I might expect an MRCB to stay closer to budget than a 401(k) with a match (remember that the amount of the match is dependent upon participant behavior). And, in a DB world, if a company happens to be cash rich and in need of a tax deduction, there will almost always be the opportunity to advance fund, thereby accelerating those deductions.

Win-Win

It is a win-win. Why make your DC plan look like a DB when there is already a plan that gives you the best of both worlds.

Benefits and Compensation After the Elections

Suppose there was a presidential election this year. Just suppose. And, further, suppose that election had a winner. Just suppose.

It is extremely likely that the winner will be someone nominated by either the Democratic Party or by the Republican Party. And, it is not at all unlikely that the party of the winner will keep or gain control of both houses of Congress.

From the standpoint of tax policy, and by extension, benefits and compensation policy, what will this mean for you, the employer or employee? Should you care?

I don't think we're far enough along to do a candidate-by-candidate analysis, but I do think that we are aided by the fact (at least I think it's a fact) that the remaining viable candidates fall generally into a few small buckets from these standpoints (yes, Carly Fiorina will give us a 3-page tax code (no idea what it might say) and Gary Johnson who has declared for the nomination of the Libertarian Party is a Fair Tax proponent). In fact, I think there are at most four such buckets remaining.

Let's identify them from left to right (that is how we usually read):

• The Democratic Socialist (DS) Bucket whose main component, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT, but caucuses with the Democrats and running for the Democratic nomination) has recently told us, "Yes, your taxes will go up."
• The Mainstream Democratic (MD) Bucket whose main component, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will, according to her website today (it did say something somewhat different on this topic at the end of last year), lower taxes for the middle class (and by extension the lower class) and raise taxes on the wealthy including big business.
• The Traditional Republican (TD) Bucket that includes the likes of [alphabetically] Chris Christie, governor of New Jersey; John Kasich, governor of Ohio; Marco Rubio, junior Senator from Florida; and Donald Trump (yes he is mainstream for this purpose), businessman from New York, which generally would lower tax brackets and flatten, or make less progressive, the tax code.
• The Conservative Republican (CR) Bucket that includes Ben Carson, retired physician from Maryland, and Ted Cruz, junior Senator from Texas which would replace the current income tax structure with a flat tax.

I'm going to make things a little tougher on you here Rather than reiterating these buckets, I'll comment on how different philosophies might affect things.

We all know the health care debate. Sanders wants to move to a single-payer system. Clinton likes the status quo under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The Republicans with the exception of Kasich want to repeal the ACA and start over again. Kasich, on the other hand, thinks that this is an impractical solution and would keep some portions of the ACA and change others.

On the pension side, Republicans as a group are in favor of self-reliance. This would tend toward a world of nothing but 401(k) (and similar) plans. Their philosophy is that prudent Americans should be able to save enough for their own retirements, especially with the benefits of an employer match. Of course, many of them will be dismayed WHEN they read my blog to know that I disagree with that.

Clinton is much tougher to figure out on this. But, we can look to her stated tax policy and work our way back. When taxes on high earners and large corporations increase, so does the value of tax deductions. So, under a Clinton presidency, we might expect to see more high earners and profitable corporations accelerate contributions to benefit plans in order to accelerate tax deductions. Could this result in somewhat of a rebirth of defined benefit (DB) plans? Theoretically, it should, but in practice, I would expect that even if that rebirth occurs, it will be very limited.

Sanders would prefer to see a single government-run retirement system for everyone; that is, we would have expanded Social Security and Medicare with smaller benefits and less availability for those who have been the highest earners. In this scenario, although I personally don't see Congress going along with it, the prevalence of employer-provided retirement plans could decline significantly. On the other hand, it would not be antithetical to his philosophy to see a DB requirement in much the same way that the ACA leaves employers with a health care requirement. Could we see pay or play here?

With regard to executive compensation (nobody is saying much about broad-based compensation other than to say that under their Presidency, there will be more and better jobs and pay will increase rapidly), we have another large rift between the candidates. Here, one of the biggest elements is the view of what has probably been President Obama's second signature bill, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank). (Why couldn't they have given the law a short name like Fred so that I don't have to test my typing skills every time I cite the law?) 

Sanders is a huge fan of Dodd-Frank. That said, he doesn't think the law has gone far enough. He has said many times that the reinstatement of Glass-Steagall should have been part of Dodd-Frank. Sanders, much like Senator Warren (D-MA) as well as former Senator Dodd (D-CT) and former Representative Frank (D-MA) believes that one of the most important parts of Dodd-Frank is Title IX, the section on executive compensation. Sanders is a huge proponent of tieing levels of executive compensation to that of the rank and file and of their companies as well as generally limiting executive compensation. Under a Sanders presidency, do not be surprised to see a presidential proposal that would limit CEO compensation for example to a pay ratio as defined in Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank to something like 10.

Clinton is also a Dodd-Frank fan. But, there is a big difference here. Secretary Clinton has long had both ties and obligations to the large Wall Street banks. She periodically invokes Glass-Steagall, but knows that its repeal allowed Goldman Sachs, for example, to grow into the financial giant that it has. At the same time, though, Clinton, who I believe is still far more likely than not to be the Democratic nominee, knows that the Democratic platform will be influenced by the likes of Sanders and Warren. Expect that the compromise will be in the form of promises to scale back executive compensation. As broad-based plans in which executives participate tend to be exempt from similar scrutiny, those higher-paid individuals may look to solutions that have been proposed over time in this blog.

On executive compensation, Republicans are fairly united. All, that I am aware, would push for the repeal of Dodd-Frank and for no more (or fewer) restrictions on executive compensation. As free market proponents, they would tell us to let the fair markets determine how top executives should be paid. All that said, proposals like that will be anathema to most (perhaps all) Democrats and unless the GOP were to gain a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate, such proposals are not likely to become law. However, as Republicans without exception are looking to lower the top marginal tax rates as well as corporate tax rates, look for more emphasis on current compensation and perhaps less emphasis on deferral opportunities.

As the 2016 election process matures and there are fewer candidates, we'll be able to dig deeper. In the meantime, you have my opinion. What's yours?

And, if you think my opinions have any merit, let me help you address what will be coming with the 2016 elections.

Preparing the Higher Paid for Retirement

Retirement readiness is getting lots of press these days. With the decrease in the number of ongoing defined benefit (DB) retirement plan, many people are finding that they are not on a path to perhaps ever be ready to retire. While most of the focus has been on lower paid, nonhighly compensated (NHCE) workers, the discussion may be more relevant for the higher paid (HCEs) workers, especially those who are not among the very highest paid. When I was growing up, these people were often referred to as the upper middle class. Today, I don't hear that term as often.

Yesterday, I read an article that on its surface would seem to address this issue. It focused on the small employer, small plan world. It laid out a multi-step additive solution:

• Safe harbor 401(k)
• Cross-tested profit sharing
• Cash balance plan
• Nonqualified plan

There is nothing wrong with this solution. In fact, at companies that take this approach, it is likely that full career employees whether they are NHCEs or HCEs will have sufficient retirement benefits to be able to retire with a style of living similar to what they had when they were working. 

That's not bad.

But, as I said, the focus here is on small employers in which the management team (often one or two owners) are earning really substantial amounts of money. While the approach outlined above and in the article may be somewhat optimal, it's not unlikely that with a less optimal approach that these HCEs could retire comfortably.

Before we go on, however, why should we care about the rest of the HCEs -- those people who for the most part have annual incomes in the range of, say, $125,000 to $200,000. They are pretty well paid. What could possibly make it difficult for them?

They do pay more in taxes. It's not unlikely that they will have to fund college educations for their child(ren) as they may make a little too much for significant financial aid to be available. And, as most people aspire to a style of living in retirement at least similar to what they had when they were working, it's going to take a lot more savings for these people to make it to that retirement target. Further, in today's world, with so many employees having a 401(k) plan as their only retirement vehicle, those HCEs who would like to save as much as the financial gurus recommend are just not able to do that in a qualified plan.

Many of these same HCEs have jobs that are not physically stressful. As a result, if they choose to, and if an employer will have them, these people can work well past traditional retirement ages. One might question whether that is good for society. Is it a desirable result? (I'll leave the thinking on that to the reader.)

What can we do? 

Since most people reading this (likely all) will not be legislators, we can't change the law even if that might be a desirable result. As I have said many times, using the 401(k) as a core retirement plan prepares almost no one for retirement. To the extent that companies feel any obligation to their employees, they must do something different.

That different plan should have some particular characteristics:

• It should be affordable to the employer
• The cost of that plan should be relatively stable; that is, volatility should be limited
• The plan should offer annuity and lump sum options to participants when they reach retirement age
• The plan should be easy to understand
• The plan should be easy to administer
• The benefit should be portable since in today's modern workforce, an employee who stays with you for more than five years is the exception, not the norm
• It should benefit the rank and file well
• It should benefit the upper middle class well
• It should benefit the executive group well

Most of the retirement world doesn't seem to want you to know about it, but this plan exists today and it is specifically sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code.

And, for all of you who are scrambling to learn more, there is plenty of information for the industry insider and the lay person alike. But, if you have more questions, you can always click here.

The Fallacy of the Participant Outcomes Mantra

I read about them virtually every day. One fund manager/defined contribution recordkeeper (vendor for purposes of the rest of this post) or another is concerned about participant outcomes. In other words, the reason that a plan sponsor should choose that particular company is because if they do, employees of that company will be prepared to retire someday.

Balderdash! Fiddlesticks!

Almost all of those vendors are preaching the same things:

• Automatic enrollment
• Automatic escalation
• Target date funds
• Retirement education

These are all great concepts, but they are not actually preparing people for retirement. Let's consider Abigail Assistant who works for Zipper Zoomers. Abby just recently started with ZZ. ZZ has hired Abby with cash compensation of $30,000 per year, based on an hourly rate of about $14.50 per hour. When she interviewed, she asked ZZ if they had medical benefits and a 401 plan (yes, she left off the "k" part). When she learned that they do, she didn't ask about details.

It turns out that ZZ does provide health benefits, but they don't pay as large a percentage of the cost as many other companies do, and their plan is a high-deductible plan. Abby and her husband Anson had already decided that 2016 would be a good year for the Assistant family to have their first child and a quick scan of her Facebook page shows that she will, in fact, be delivering Archibald Assistant later on this year. We also learn from her Facebook page that she plans to take 6 weeks off and then put dear little Archie in daycare.

Abby and Anson are going to have really high health care costs in 2016. But, when she started with ZZ, she got all this paperwork and didn't know what to do with it. She accepted her auto-enrollment at 3% of pay ($900 if she didn't take maternity leave). She also accepted her auto-escalation that will kick her up to a 4%  deferral next year. With ZZ's 2% budget for pay raises, her 2017 pay is expected to be $30,600 resulting a deferral of $1224. So her take home pay reflecting only the deductions for the 401(k) plan has only increased by $276 (600 minus 324) or less than 1%. But Abby and Anson's expenses have gone up far more than that. How will they cope?

Always resourceful, Abby and Anson have the answers. They have credit cards with hefty credit limits. That's a source of funds to pay the bills with. And, they learned that they can borrow against Abby's 401(k) account.

Okay, you all know where this is headed. The Assistants are not on the right track and unless they can get off of it, they will never be prepared for retirement. But, how does this make their vendor wrong?

Auto-enrollment and auto-escalation work for those who can afford it. It doesn't work for those who are living day to day, and sadly today, that seems to be the majority of American families.

In the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Congress claims to have intended to protected pensions. They did take some very positive steps while they were at it though by statutorily legalizing what are known as hybrid plans (cash balance, pension equity, variable annuity, etc.) and while they were at it, statutorily legalizing market return hybrid plans.

If you really want to help to prepare your employees for retirement, these are better vehicles. With modern designs and investment strategies, you can control costs. In fact, you can budget your costs better than you can in a 401(k) plan where the amount of matching contributions that you have to make is dependent on the amount that employees choose to defer.

I've seen all the illustrations and projections. Yes, Polly and Peter Professional who both came out of college and got higher paying jobs and who don't plan to have kids until they have been in the workforce for 10 or more years, bought a house and saved both inside and outside their 401(k) plans will be well-prepared, but for all the Abby and Anson's of the world, the participant outcomes will defy what the vendors are saying.

It's not pretty.

Fees and Higher Cost Asset Classes in Retirement Plans

Earlier this week, I wrote about Bell v Anthem and the rampant litigation over fees in defined contribution plans. I thought I'd take this one step farther today and discuss a few related topics.

Since this post in particular is highly legal in nature and deals with a number of investment topics, I am going to reiterate that I am not an attorney and do not provide legal advice nor am I a CFA, CFP, or RIA, and I do not provide investment advice. Any of either that you glean from this piece is at your own risk and is not intended.

For the most part, the fee-related class action suits have been about failure of the plan sponsor and its committee to properly follow its own Investment Policy and to fail to use the least expensive funds available when it does. Suppose the retirement plan in question along with its committee believe that it's in the best interest of plan participants to have a truly diversified set of investment options available to them in the plan. And, by truly diversified, they have included a set of alternative investments and hedge funds. Many plans do not.

Alternative investments as a group tend to be expensive. One might argue that it takes a more unique skill set to manage them and that simple supply and demand justifies the higher fee structure. Whether that argument holds water or not is not the purpose here, but in any event, you just don't see inexpensive alternative investment funds. Hedge funds tend to be among the most expensive of all. Seen as the ultimate in risk and reward, fees are usually extraordinarily high when compared to other asset classes.

Now, we return to the ERISA requirements that a fiduciary act in the best interests of plan participants and that expenses not be more than reasonable (as an aside, I don't think the word reasonable should ever be in the statute because your idea of reasonable may incorrectly differ with my correct idea of reasonable ... just kidding).

What makes an expense reasonable? In the case of an S&P 500 index fund, we would expect the returns before subtracting out expenses to be virtually identical for two funds, and therefore would hope that the funds with expenses toward the lower end of the spectrum available for the plan would be considered reasonable. Two international real property funds, on the other hand, will not have the same returns. And, each probably only has one share class (in other words, there is not a retail and wholesale or institutional). If Fund A has been returning (over the last 10 years) 14% per year before subtracting expenses and Fund B only 11% per year before subtracting expenses, does Fund A justify a higher level of expenses?

I don't know.

Could you get sued if you offer Fund A in your plan with expenses at 3.5% rather than Fund B with expenses at 2%? Yes, you could. Would you win that suit? I don't know.

The whole concept raises an interesting question that I touched on the other day. With all of these 401(k) lawsuits, is it prudent to offer a 401(k) plan? Is it prudent to be on the Investment Committee of a 401(k) plan? Is it prudent to offer a fund lineup in a 401(k) plan over which you could get sued, but on which you have absolutely no idea on which merits or lack thereof the case would be judged?

I don't know the answer to any of those questions, but I think they are food for thought.

Three decades ago, the defined benefit plan was king and defined contribution plans were far more often thought as a supplemental means of saving. This concept makes more sense to me.

Is it time for a return? Is it time for a return if you have all of the characteristics of that 401(k) plan without the attendant litigation risk? I think maybe it is.

Will Fee Litigation Kill the 401(k)?

401(k) litigation is going mad. In two of the most publicized cases, Tibble v Edison and Hecker v Deere, there may have been something legitimate for plaintiffs to complain about. In the latest case, however, this one fashioned as Bell v Anthem, the litigation makes this blogger wonder why a company would offer a 401(k) plan at all.

Essentially, all of this litigation stems from ERISA Section 404(c) which among other things establishes that a retirement committee and its members individually are to act in a fiduciary manner in the best interests of plan participants with respect to the plan. For years, issues under 404(c) were not litigated, and in fact, most of us weren't entirely sure how to apply 404(c).

As plans have gotten bigger and the number of investment options has grown significantly, some attorneys have found this to be particularly fertile ground for litigation. In some cases, the issues have been judged by the courts to be clear.

As an example, suppose that XYZ Investment Company offers a large cap equity fund. Not only does XYZ offer that fund, but it has two share classes -- a retail class to which it charges accounts a fee of 80 basis points and a wholesale or institutional class to which it charges a fee of 40 basis points. This is a large difference and to the extent that a plan sponsor and committee have the leverage to have the institutional class as compared to the retail class in its fund lineup, they should.

You can do the math if you choose. Using something as simple as the Rule of 72 (you can google it if you are not familiar to estimate the results), Ms. W's account balance will double approximately every 15.6 years while Mr. R's will double about every 17.1 years. Or said, differently, at the end of 35 years, Ms. W will have roughly 3 years of excess returns over Mr. R, at least on her initial deferral. Her more recent deferrals will have smaller amounts of excess returns.

Is this material? I don't know; you tell me. Is it significant enough that the plan committee should be held liable if they opted for retail class instead of institutional? That's up to the courts.

Now, we return to Bell v Anthem. The plan in question is large. Its assets total roughly $5 billion. A plan of that size certainly has the leverage to get the least expensive share classes available for its participants, regardless of whose funds they are placing in the plan. Even the big players drool over the prospects of picking up a large mandate in a plan that big.

In the particular case, all but two of the funds offered were Vanguard funds. Vanguard has a reputation, supported by data, in the industry as having one of the lowest fee structures of anyone out there.

Of the funds that were not Vanguard, one was the Touchstone Sands Capital Select Growth Fund (Institutional Class) with a 1.31% expense ratio according to Touchstone's website. The other was the Artisan Midcap Value Fund (Institutional Class) with an expense ratio in the vicinity of 1.15% according to Artisan's website.

None of the Vanguard funds had expense ratios exceeding 0.5%. The Vanguard Target Date Funds had expense ratios of less than 0.2%. Index funds in the plan had expense ratios ranging from 24 basis points down to 4 basis points. Very few knowledgeable observers would consider those expenses to be high, and in fact, most plan advisers that I know would consider them low.

Plaintiffs, however, allege that the 4 basis point fee is too high, as there was an asset class available for the same fund that only charged 2 basis points. I saw that and wondered how material that is.

Going back again to the rule of 72, I compared the two different expense ratios. With an expense ratio of 2 basis points, an initial investment would double with a 5% gross investment return about every 14.46 years. With the 4 basis point expense ratio, it would double about every 14.52 years. That's a difference of less than one month.

Could Anthem have had the less expensive fund? Probably. Are there any complications associated with it? I haven't looked into that? Was the committee and its members guilty of some sort of fiduciary malfeasance by offering the higher cost (4 basis point) fund to its participants? The courts will have to decide that.

The issues in the suit continue. It contends that because of the size of the plan that even the Institutional Class Fund is not good enough. Instead, the suit contends, Anthem could have negotiated separate Anthem accounts at an even lower cost.

Is this practical? I don't know. Does ERISA hold fiduciaries to that standard? I don't know. If it does, would I want to be on a defined contribution plan's investment committee? Absolutely not.

My reading of ERISA suggests to me that a fiduciary is to take reasonable care in acting in the best interests of plan participants. It strikes me that reasonable care includes making good decisions. It does not strike me that reasonable care requires each committee and committee member to spend enough time to make the best decision possible.

Perhaps I am wrong though. It wouldn't be the first time.

But, let's return to the separate accounts. How long would it have taken Anthem to negotiate those separate accounts? How good a deal would they get? Since that negotiation would be on behalf of plan participants, could they charge their time back to those participants? I don't know.

Either way, if this sort of suit becomes the norm, it's time to get rid of employer-sponsored individual account plans. Businesses are in business to provide products and services. When their 401(k) plans change the way they do business, it's time to stop.

Where Did We Go Awry With the 401(k)?

Section 401(k) was added to the Internal Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1978. It was such a significant part of that act that when I went to www.congress.gov to read the act summary, there was no mention of this new deferral opportunity. It was tossed into the legislation with little fanfare.

Why was that?

401(k) plans were never intended to be the primary retirement vehicle for the masses. In 1978, after the passage of the relatively new landmark law known as ERISA, defined benefit plans (DB) were all the rage and those companies that had chosen not to take the DB route frequently offered profit sharing plans, money purchase plans, or ESOPs, or because of the special tax treatment that they were given at the time, tax credit ESOPs, known back then as TRASOPs (bonus points for anyone who recalled TRASOPs before reading this).

Those were core retirement plans. Combined with Social Security, they were designed to be two legs of the so-called three-legged stool needed for retirement. The third leg was personal savings and the 401(k) plan was supposed to give people a more tax-efficient way to grow that third leg. Read that again; 401(k) plans were designed as savings plans, not as [core] retirement plans.

Somewhere, things went awry. I have written about this many times and blamed virtually everyone who had a voice. As our government and regulators made it more and more cumbersome to sponsor traditional retirement plans and the US economy took several turns for the worse, companies became less comfortable as sponsors of traditional retirement plans. They often placed the blame anywhere that they could. In fact, they placed it everywhere except where it belonged:

• Employees didn't appreciate the other plans (it turned out that the people who didn't have them sure thought their friends who had them had a good deal)
• They could be more competitive without them (don't you get higher productivity and better products and services from happy employees)
• The 401(k) would be enough (of course many of those same companies retained their executive retirement plans)

Now, in a workforce fraught with high turnover, low morale, and lots of part-time jobs, many of us expect employees to save for their own retirement. Projections done by proponents of those plans show that those who do will have a wonderful retirement. Those projections tend to leave out all of these complications:

• You can't defer when you are laid off and most of us seem to face one or more layoffs in our careers these days
• You will have periods in your career when you go through one hardship or another and can't afford to make the deferral you would like
• If you do have a hardship and have to pull money out, those penalties are severe
• You absolutely will not get the 7%-9% annual return on investment, net of expenses, that many of those projections would "promise"

But, companies persist in the belief that the 401(k) is the retirement plan of choice. Potential employees ask about the company's "401 plan." In the meantime, some people retire very early and many will be retiring well after the traditional retirement zone of ages 62 through 65 has passed them by. 

Isn't it time to bring back retirement plans and have more than just savings plans? Any of them can be designed today with the proper administration to show employees their account balance as of that day any day that they choose to look.

You can be an employer of choice.

A Less Expensive Way to Provide Better Retirement Benefits -- DB

I've been pushing defined benefit (DB) plans hard lately. I still believe in them. The problem as I have noted is that regulators don't. They have done everything they can to kill them. Many are gone, many remain.

Yesterday, I happened upon a brief from Boston College's Center for Retirement Research. If you want, you can get the full brief here. In the brief, based on 23 years of data, Alicia Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Caroline Crawford -- all from the CCRC -- demonstrate that returns on assets in DB plans actually are better than those in defined contribution (DC) plans.

When you combine this with the inability of many to defer enough to their 401(k) plans to get the full company match, you can see why many will never be able to retire well with a 401(k) as their core retirement plan.

For years, though, the cry has been that people understand 401(k) plans, but don't understand DB. But, suppose I gave you a DB plan that looked like a DC plan, provided returns for participants like a particularly well-invested DC plan, provided better downside investment return protection than a DC plan, and cost the employer less than a DC plan. What would you think?

In the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (yes, that was more than 9 years ago), Congress sanctioned what are now known as market return cash balance plans. What they are are DB plans that look like DC plans to participants, provide more and better opportunities for participants to elect annuity forms of distribution if they like, and provide the opportunity for plan sponsors to control costs and create almost a perfect investment hedge if they choose.

Suppose you had such a plan. Suppose to participants looking at their retirement website, the plan just looked like another account any day they chose to look. Suppose the costs were stable. Suppose the plan provided you as a sponsor more flexibility.

That would be nirvana in Xanadu, or something like that, wouldn't it?

Another Argument for Defined Benefit

I know, defined benefit (DB) plans are dead. Actually, while there aren't as many as there used to be, I'm going to give you one more argument why they make more sense as a retirement vehicle.

Yesterday, I wrote about managing the risk in active pension liabilities. Way back in 2010, I wrote about generally managing risks and noted that plan sponsors tend not to manage defined contribution plan risks. Most of those risks that I have considered have been financial risk. Today, I am going to focus on the intersection of financial risk and compliance risk and make a case to have a DB plan as your primary retirement vehicle rather than a 401(k) plan.

In the world of 2015, we see consolidation in many industries. We also see companies, often private, being gobbled up by private equity firms. Either of these actions will usually create a larger controlled group. And, people who focus on retirement plan compliance know that most retirement plan compliance testing must be done on a controlled group basis.

Before working to point out a solution, let me give you an example to help focus on the problem.

BPE is a big private equity firm. Their general approach to retirement plans (and other benefits) has been to ignore them and let each company do what it wants. But, as BPE get bigger, its controlled group gets more complex. Having multiple industries represented in its portfolio, BPE is ultimately the sponsor of all kinds of 401(k) plans. Their engineering company (EC) has an extremely generous 401(k) plan that matches 150% on the first 8% of pay that an employee defers. Their pork rinds company (PRC) has a 401(k) plan that matches 10 cents on the dollar on the first 2% of pay that an employee defers.

BPE never saw this as a problem. But, then one day, an inquisitive Principal (IP) at BPE was reading my blog (of all things) and came across this. He saw that BPE might have a compliance problem in its controlled group because of the disparate nature of its 401(k) plans.

Ring ring ring -- that's my phone as IP calls me. He wants to know how to fix the problem. He says that surely this problem can't be real. After an hour on the phone, we have inventoried all the plans at BPE and found that they have failed to satisfy various compliance tests (coverage under Code Section 410(b), for example) for several years.

IP has a solution though. He tells me that BPE will force some of its companies to retroactively cut the employer match in some of these more generous plans.

Bzzz!

You can't do that. In fact, if BPE were to choose to fall on its sword and approach the IRS for a negotiated retroactive solution, we would suspect that the IRS would only be receptive to increasing benefits for nonhighly compensated employees (NHCEs) in the less generous plans.

IP is not happy about this. PRC runs on very low margins, but because they make more pork rinds than any company in the world, they do throw off a lot of cash. However, increasing benefits would eliminate most of that free cash that is being generated. There is stunned silence on the other end of my phone.

While the story is fictitious, the gist of the scenario is not. I've seen this happen. By being a serial acquirer, companies run into compliance problems and with 401(k) plans not being the easiest to prove nondiscriminatory, either costs escalate or they get cut at the portfolio companies that tend to employ more higher paid individuals.

What sort of plan tests better? A few weeks ago, I wrote about some. Suppose BPE had a defined contribution looking cash balance plan. One of the nice things about these plans is that they test well. Designed properly, and proper design truly is a key, financial risk is manageable. And, with that as their primary plan, the secondary 401(k)s can be managed so that compliance there will no longer be an issue.

Unfortunately, the benefits world has been resistant to this whole concept. But, you have an open mind, don't you?

We need to talk.

CFO Priorities and Benefits and Compensation

CFO magazine did their annual survey of the priorities of chief financial officers recently. I read their article summarizing the findings from the survey and considered what this might mean for benefits and compensation.

Before I go on to my main topic, however, I need to bring up a few of the issues that I found near the bottom of the article. Three priorities that the article highlighted were written communication, networking with peers and presenting to large groups. Frankly, these are not just CFO priorities; they should be priorities for every professional in our 2015 world, and I was absolutely thrilled to see written communication in the list.

Returning to the main points of the article, I point out some of the top priorities that are more day-to-day for CFOs.

• Precision and efficiency in cash forecasting
• Budgeting
• Balanced scorecards
• Margins
• Risk management
• Performance management

Additionally, and in many cases perhaps more important, but less relevant for this blog is cybersecurity.

Let's also consider what some of the main elements of traditional benefits and compensation packages look like (with some grouping at my discretion).

• Health and wellness benefits
• Retirement benefits
• Other traditional welfare benefits
• Feelgood benefits
• Base pay
• Short-term incentives (bonus)
• Long-term incentives (often equity)

Health benefits are now essentially a requirement. Either you provide them or pay a fine under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). But, companies have lots of techniques that they can use to control costs. Popular today are high-deductible health plans (HDHP) where oftentimes, companies contribute fixed amounts to health savings accounts (HSAs) to help employees pay for costs up to those deductibles. Among the major advantages of these designs are that companies do a much better job of locking in their costs. In other words, more costs are known and far fewer costs are variable or unknown. 

On the subject of retirement benefits, I'm going to give you a shocker. In matching those CFO priorities, the single worst sort of retirement plan that a company can sponsor is a traditional 401(k) plan with a company match. That's right -- it's the worst! Why is that? In a 401(k) plan, the amount of money that a company spends is almost entirely dependent upon employee behavior. If you, as an employer, communicate the value of the plan, employees defer more and that costs you more. Most companies budget a number for their cash outlay for the 401(k) plan. Very few, in my experience, look at potential variability. One that does and that I worked with on this a number of years ago, estimates that between best case and worst case, that the difference in their cash outlay could be in the range of several hundred million dollars. That is a lot of money.

So, what is better?

Believe it or not, I can come up with lots of rationales (much beyond the scope of this post) for why having a defined benefit plan as a company's primary retirement vehicle is superior to using a 401(k) plan. Understand, I'm not talking about just any DB plan. But, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) opened the door for new types of DB plans that either were not expressly permitted previously or, in other cases, that were generally not considered feasible. Think about a cash balance plan using a market return interest crediting rate with plan investments selected to properly hedge fluctuation. Cash flow becomes predictable. Volatility generally goes away. Budgeting is simple. The plan can be designed to not negatively affect margins.

I may write more in a future post, but for now, suffice it to say that this design that has not yet caught on in the corporate world needs some real consideration.

How about compensation? 

Base pay is the easiest to budget for. If you do have a budget and commit to not spending outside of that budget, base pay is pretty simple to keep within your goals. 

Incentive compensation is trickier. While many organizations have "bonus pools", they also tend to have formulaic incentive programs. So, what happens when the some of the formulaic incentives exceeds the amount in the bonus pool? Either you blow your budget or you make people particularly unhappy. There is little that will cause a top performer to leave your company faster than having her calculate that her bonus is to be some particular number of dollars only to learn that it got cut back to 70% of that number because the company didn't budget properly.

Perhaps it is better to assign an individual a number of bonus credits based on their performance and then compare their number of credits to the total number of credits allocated to determine a ratio of the total bonus pool awarded to that individual. After all, isn't the performance of the company roughly equal to the sum pf the performances of individuals and teams? And, if the company has a bad year, isn't it impossible that every individual and team exceeded expectations? Be honest, you know that has happened at lots of companies and the companies don't know what to do or how to explain it.

There is lots more to be said, but I want to keep it brief for now. If you have questions on some of the specifics, please post here or on Twitter or LinkedIn in reply to my post or tweet. And, if you have one of these areas on which you'd like to see me expand in a future post, let me know about that as well.

Get Your 401(k) Design Right

I happened to read a few things today about 401(k) matching contributions. One in particular talked about stretching the match. Apparently that means that if you are willing to spend 3% of pay on your workforce, consider making your match 50 cents on the dollar on the first 6% of pay deferred instead of dollar for dollar on the first 3% of pay deferred. This will encourage employees to save more.

That might be a really good idea ... for some companies. For other companies, it might not be.

First and foremost a 401(k) plan is, and should be, an employee benefit plan. Taken quite literally, that means that it should be for the benefit of employees.

Plan sponsors may look at the plan and say that they get a tax deduction. That's true, but they also get a tax deduction for reasonable compensation. And, there is probably less of a compliance burden with paying cash than there is with maintaining a 401(k) plan.

Where does the typical 401(k) design come from? Usually, it's the brainchild, or lack thereof, of someone internal to the plan sponsor or of an external adviser. Either way, that could be a good thing or a bad thing. Most plan sponsors have plenty of smart and thoughtful employees and many external advisers are really good.

On the other hand, when it comes to designing a 401(k) plan, some people just don't ask the right questions. And, just as important, they don't answer the right questions. We often see this in marketing pieces or other similar propaganda that talk about designing the best plan. We might see that the best plan has all of these features:

• Safe harbor design (to avoid ADP and ACP testing)
• Auto-enrollment (to get higher participation rates)
• Auto-escalation (so that people will save more)
• Target date fund as a QDIA (because virtually every recordkeeper wants you in their target date funds)

All of these could be great features for your 401(k) plan, but on the other hand, they might not be. Let's consider why.

Safe harbor designs are really nice. They eliminate the need for ADP and ACP nondiscrimination testing. They also provide for immediate vesting of matching contributions. Suppose your goal, as plan sponsor, is to use your 401(k) plan at least in part as a retention device. Suppose further that every year, you pass your ADP and ACP tests with ease. Then, one would wonder why you are adopting a plan with immediate vesting whose sole benefit is the elimination of ADP and ACP testing. Perhaps someone told you that safe harbor plans were the best and you listened. Perhaps nobody bothered to find out why you were sponsoring a 401(k) plan and what you expected to gain from having that plan.

Auto-enrollment is another feature that is considered a best practice. (Oh I despise that term and would prefer to call it something other than best, but best practice is a consulting buzzword.) Most surveys that I have read indicate that where auto-enrollment is in place, the most common auto-enrollment level is 3% of pay. Your adviser who just knows that he has to tell you about auto-enrollment tells you that it is a best practice. Perhaps he didn't consider that prior to auto-enrollment, you had 93% participation and that 87% of those 93% already deferred more than 3% of pay. Since he heard it was the thing to do, he advised you to re-enroll everyone and now, you are up to 95% participation, but only 45% of them defer more than 3% of pay. Perhaps nobody bothered to ask you how your current plan was doing.

In the words of a generation younger than me, this is an epic fail.

I could go on and on about other highly recommended features, but the moral of the story is largely the same. Your plan design should fit with your company, your employees, your recruiting and retention needs, and your budget. That your largest competitor has a safe harbor plan doesn't make it right for you. It may not even be right for them. That the company whose headquarters are across the hall from yours has auto-escalation doesn't make it right for you. It may not be right for them either.

If you are designing or redesigning a plan for your company, ask some basic questions before you go there.

• What do you want to accomplish with the plan?
• Enough wealth accumulation so that your employees can retire based solely on that plan?
• Enough so that the plan is competitive?
• Something else?
• Will eliminating nondiscrimination testing be important?
• What is your budget? Will it change from year to year? As a dollar amount? As a percentage of payroll?
• What do you want your employees to think of the plan?
• It's a primary retirement vehicle.
• My employer has a 401(k) plan; that's all I need to know.
• My employer has a great 401(k) plan.
• My 401(k) is a great place to save, but I need additional savings as well.
• Will any complexity that I add to the plan help my company to meet its goals or my employees to meet their goals? If not, why did I add that complexity?

These are the types of questions that your adviser asked you when you designed or last redesigned your plan, aren't they?

They're not?

Perhaps it's time to rethink your plan.