Are You Better Off than You Were 20 Years Ago?

Nearly 40 years ago, Ronald Reagan asked voters if they were better off than they were four years earlier. And, that was the beginning of the end for Jimmy Carter's reelection hopes. So, without trying to end anything for you, I ask if you are better off from a retirement standpoint than you were 20 years ago.

For Americans as a group, I think the answer is a clear no. Our retirement system has been broken by the momentum that has gathered around the 401(k) plan. After all, when Section 401(k) was added to the Internal Revenue Code in the Revenue Act of 1978, it was never intended to be a primary retirement vehicle. In fact, it was a throw in that even among those who were there, there doesn't seem to be much agreement on why it was thrown into the Act.

When it was, however, defined benefit (DB) pension plans were in their heyday. People who were fortunate enough to be in those plans then are now retired and an awful lot of them are living very well in retirement. On the other hand, people who are now retiring having been in 401(k) plans only have their retirement fates scattered all over the place. Some are very well off, bit others are essentially living off of Social Security.

Let's consider where those people went wrong. For many, when they first had the opportunity to defer, they chose not to. They had bills to pay and they just couldn't make ends meet if they didn't take that current income. By the time they realized that they should have been saving all along, they couldn't catch up.

For others, they were doing well until they lost a job. Where could they get current income? They took a 401(k) distribution.

Yes, I am very well aware that the models show that people who are auto-enrolled and auto-escalated in a 401(k) plan with a safe harbor match will fare quite well. Those models all assume no disruptions and constant returns on account balances of usually around 7%.

Let's return to reality. The reality is that young workers are (likely because of all the campaigns telling them to do so) deferring liberally when they start in the workforce. The problem is, and I get this anecdotally from young workers, that more of them than not reach a point where they just can't defer at those levels any more. They get married, buy a house, and have kids, and the financial equation doesn't work. So, they cut back on deferrals. I know a number who have gutted one or more of their 401(k) plans in order to buy a house. The fact is that it's not easy to defer, for example, 10% of your pay into your 401(k), another 5% into your health savings account (HSA), and save money for a down payment on a house.

Where were we 20 years ago? For many Americans, they were about to be getting those notices that their DB plans were getting frozen. Congress killed those DB plans. The FASB killed those DB plans.

When I got into this business in 1985, most (not all) corporate pension plans were being funded responsibly. And, this status was helped, albeit for only a year or two by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (shortening amortization periods). One of the big keys, and this will be understood largely by actuaries, is that we had choices of actuarial cost methods. My favorite then and it would be now as well for traditional DB plans is known as the entry age normal (EAN) method. The reason for this is that under EAN, the current (or normal) cost of a plan was either a level cost per participant (for non pay-related plans) or a level percentage of payroll for pay-related plans. Put yourself in the position of a CFO -- that makes it really easy to budget for.

But Congress and the FASB knew better. In the Pension Protection Act of 1987 (often referred to OBRA 87 because it was one title of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act), we had it imposed on us that we must perform a Unit Credit (another actuarial cost method) valuation for all DB plans. And, in doing that Unit Credit (UC) valuation, we were given prescribed discount rates. At about the same time (most companies adopted what was then called FAS 87 and is now part of ASC 715), DB plan sponsors also had to start doing a separate accounting valuation using the Projected Unit Credit (PUC)  (Unit Credit for non-pay related plans) actuarial cost method. Most of those sponsors found that their fees would be less if they just used these various unit credit methods for their regular valuations as well and we were off and running ... in the wrong direction.

You see, PUC generally produced lower funding requirements than EAN and the arbitrary limits on funding put in place by that second funding regime known as current liability (the UC valuation) and most DB plans had what is known as a $0 full funding limit. In other words, they could not make deductible contributions to their DB plans during much of the 1990s. And, it stayed that way until prescribed discount rates plummeted and there were a few years of investment losses.

What happened then?

CFOs balked. They had gotten used to running these plans for free. Suddenly they had to contribute to them and because the funding rules were entirely broken, the amounts that they had to contribute were volatile and unpredictable. That's a bad combination.

So, one after another, sponsors began to freeze those DB plans. And, they did it at just the time that their workers could least afford it.

For all the data and models that tell us that it should be otherwise, more people than ever before are working into their 70s, generally, in my opinion, because they have to, not because they want to. As a population, we're not better off in this regard than we were 20 years ago In fact we are far worse off.

Even for those people who did accumulate large account balances, many of them don't know how to handle that money in retirement and they don't have longevity protection.

We need a fresh start. We need funding rules that makes sense and we need a plan of the future. It shouldn't be that difficult. I'd like to think that my actuarial brethren are smart people and that they can design that cadre of plans. They'll be understandable, they'll be portable as people change jobs, they'll have lump sum options and annuity options , and they'll even have longevity insurance. They'll allow participants the ability to combine all those in, for example, taking 30% of their benefit as a lump sum, using 55% for an annuity from the plan beginning at retirement, and 15% to "buy" cost-of-living protection from the plan.

That's great, isn't it? Even most of the 535 people in Congress would probably tell you that it is.

But those same 535 people don't really understand a lick about DB plans or generally about retirement plans (there are a few exceptions, but very few). In order to get that fresh start, we need laws that will allow those designs to work.

We surely don't have them now.

Over the years, Congress has punished the many plan sponsors because of a few bad actors. If 95% of DB plans were being funded responsibly, then Congress changed the funding rules for 100% of plans to be more punitive because of the other 5%.

Isn't it time to go back to the future to get this all fixed?

Let's kill the 401(k) as a primary retirement plan and develop the plan of the future. It could be here much sooner than you think.

Lessons From California Public Pensions

Over the last few days, the print media (at least we used to call it print media) has hit hard on public pensions in the State of California. The New York Times hit hard on the differences between the "actuarial approach" and the "market approach." The Los Angeles Times took on a pension deal from the late 90s. Both of these are symptomatic of the issues that all of taxpayers, legislators, workers, and actuaries face in the public pension world.

Let's take a step back. Some of the most generous of all public pensions are those available to public safety officers primarily police and fire. I could give you lots of reasons why this approach is correct and why it's not. You might disagree with my analysis on all of them, but that's not what's important here.

Historically, people who have chosen careers in police and fire have thought of their careers differently than people in most other professions. Those careers are very risky and they are physically demanding. Many in those professions would tell you and me that lasting more than 30 years or so is just not practical. And, if we take that as a correct statement (I do), then it is reasonable that such public safety officers be eligible to retire from that career earlier than we would expect in most other careers. After all, if you were trapped in a burning building, would you be happy if the people trying to save you were just trying to hang on until normal retirement age at 65, but weren't really physically capable of handling such a demanding task?

Over time, states, cities, towns, and other governmental organizations found the answer. Provide those public safety officers with a significant incentive to retire early (compared to other careers) and if you do that, you don't have to pay them all that much. So, what that has historically achieved is that costs for current public safety employees have been relatively lower and costs have been deferred into their retirements.

That's a problem. It doesn't need to occur. The correct answer for a governmental employer, or other employer, is to realize that deferred compensation (that's what a pension is) is earned during a employee's working lifetime. Therefore, it should be paid for during that working lifetime. After all, once an individual in any profession retires, they no longer provide a benefit to the organization that they previously worked for. Further, the burden to pay for those pensions should not be passed on to future generations of taxpayers.

In the past, I have commented about various actuarial cost methods. An actuarial cost method is a technique for allocating costs to the past, the present, and the future. Looking at things as any of a taxpayer, legislator, employer, or employee (I happen to not be all of those, but even so, I can put myself in the shoes of those that I am not), the correct answer has the following characteristics:

• An employee's pension is paid for (funded) over their working lifetime. Once they retire, the cost of providing their benefit is over. (Understand that actuarial gains and losses make this an inexact science, but we should be close.)
• The cost of providing that employee's pension should be level. That is, it should either be a constant percentage of their pay or a constant dollar amount. As an employer, I can budget for that. 

Let's consider an example of that second bullet. Suppose I pay a public safety officer $60,000 per year (I know -- in some jurisdictions that seems high and in others it seems low) in salary. Further suppose that their deferred compensation costs me 10% of pay annually. Then when I am budgeting for that person, I know how to budget every year. If their pay goes up by 5%, so does the cost of their pension, roughly. This year, I budget $66,000 for current plus deferred compensation. Next year, with that 5% budgeted increase, I budget $69,300 for current plus deferred compensation.

There is an actuarial cost method that does exactly this. It's called Entry Age Normal (EAN). When I entered the actuarial profession back during the days when we used green accounting paper rather than spreadsheets, in my experience, EAN was the actuarial cost method of choice. But, it had its downsides. 

• Neither the accounting profession nor the federal legislators accepted it as the method of choice.
• Employers were advised that their current cash cost would be lower using a different actuarial cost method. It's easy to say you will fix that problem later on.
• Observers understand a method where you pay for benefits as they accrue, but nor one in which you pay for benefits as they are allocated by actuaries.

So, now we have come to a crossroads. Many of the largest public pension plans are horribly underfunded regardless of how you determine funding levels (some have been funded responsibly; others have not). Getting them well funded requires cash which can only come from increasing taxes or from taking money from elsewhere in the budget (dream on). Legislators want to get re-elected which means you don't raise taxes. 

Hmm, I see a problem here.

The problem extends to private pensions as well, but there are  good solutions there. Since EAN is not available as an actuarial cost method anymore (we could choose to have our valuation done using the legally prescribed Unit Credit actuarial cost method, but fund not less than the EAN cost although that is very rarely done), we need to look in other places. 

Plan design is an excellent lever in this regard. Suppose we had a plan design  that even under a Unit Credit cost method allowed us to achieve exactly what we are talking about here. And, suppose that design allowed for all the benefits of defined benefit plans (DB) including market-priced with no built-in profits annuity options, professional investing, no leakage, portability, and virtually no cost volatility. Wouldn't that be an ideal world?

That design exists. And, you can have it now.