Compensating Executives in a "Challenging" World

The rationale has always gone something like this: if you don't compensate your executives at least equal to their peers and if you don't reward their performance, you will never have a top tier executive group and your company will not succeed.

Is that statement true? Is part of it true?

We're getting much closer to finding out. The big news this proxy season is from shareholder proposals on executive compensation. That's right -- since Say-on-Pay votes are non-binding, shareholder groups are looking to force companies to put components of executive compensation to a binding shareholder vote.

Before getting into a few details, let's understand how most companies are reacting. It's not surprising, but as a group, large corporations do not think their shareholders understand executive compensation. They are seeking to keep these votes off of their proxies. As a precursor to doing so, they request what is known as a "no-action letter" from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In brief, when a government agency issues a no-action letter, it assures the requestor that it will not take action on a given issue. So, when a company seeks such a letter from the SEC, the company is asking the SEC to confirm that it will not take action, for example, for a failure to place a particular item in its definitive proxy.

One of the most ardent submitters of executive compensation proposals is the largest American labor union, the AFL-CIO. In a statement, the AFL-CIO said, "We opposed compensation plans that provide windfalls to executives that are unrelated to their performance."

On its surface, that seems very prudent. But, it may be a bit trickier in practice.

What makes compensation related to performance? How does one define performance? Is compensation as expressed in the Summary Compensation Table? Is it cash only? Does it include equity? Does it include the (proxy-includable) value of deferred compensation?

Here is how it would strike me.

• Base pay is not related to performance. But, generally, to the extent that such pay is deductible to the employer under Section 162(m) ($1 million pay cap), some observers will not consider it to be egregious. On the other hand, in today's world of pay ratios and calls for increases in rank and file wages, other observers will ask that it be capped at some multiple of either the median pay for the entire company or even that of the lowest-paid employees of the company.
• Bonuses are theoretically related to performance. To the extent that the criteria used to evaluate executive performance and by extension, executive bonuses, are appropriate, so should those bonuses be. To play devil's advocate, however, if an executive knows how her bonus will be calculated, she may take inappropriate risks (for the company) in order to maximize the expected value of her bonus. Similarly, she may find ways to accelerate certain items into the fiscal year in question while deferring others until the next year. 
• Long-term incentives are [nearly] always performance based. In today's world, it is expected that those incentive payouts will be based on the achievement of a set of goals related to metrics deemed appropriate for that executive. Often, there are circuit breakers (elements that if the executive fails to meet a pre-established minimum level of performance, he will not receive a payout or that part of a payout at all). But, long-term incentives are often paid in company equity. This means that compensation will, to a large extent, be tied to share price. As we know, however, share price is not always tied to corporate performance. On any given day, share price may be influenced by such as the state of peace or war in the Middle East, a speech given by the President of the United States, or the rise or fall of housing starts during the last month. 
• What about deferred compensation (here I am referring to traditional deferred compensation plans, either defined benefit or defined contribution)? It's rarely performance based. Theoretically, the company is paying an executive less today for a promise to give them some of that pay in the future. What sorts of plans should be challenged? If an executive voluntarily defers some of their compensation and it grows at a rate tied to some broadly investable index, is that okay? Suppose she has a DB SERP that looks just like the broad-based plan (qualified plan), but without limitations applicable to qualified plans. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) is generally fine with this, but major labor unions may not be. And, if that SERP looks very different from qualified plans, even if there is a good reason for it, this may be a situation where no institutional shareholders are satisfied.

What should Boards of Directors and their Compensation Committees do about all of this? ConocoPhillips shareholders are asking that the Compensation Committee develop a program to determine which portions of a bonus should be paid immediately, which portions should be deferred, and what adjustments should be made to those deferrals based on performance.

Perhaps this has some merit. If it does, however, it's a bit of a nightmare for people who need to figure out how to make such a plan 409A-compliant and for those who need to administer FICA tax payments.

On the other hand, if adjustments are to be made based on performance, can't the same executive who is able to manipulate performance metrics in the LTI scenario described above also find a way to manipulate them here? Where there are objective formulas, there are smart people who can figure out how to game the system. Where there are subjective evaluations, Boards will be accused of pandering to the executives of the companies.

More than ever, the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) will be very key. Explaining why the mix of objective and subjective factors was chosen can go a long way to appeasing large shareholders. Explaining how levels of compensation were chosen is a must. And, for the first time, we may see companies rationalizing their levels of executive pay as compared to rank and file pay.

With all of these challenges to executive compensation, these are challenging times for Compensation Committees.

On ISS and SERPs

We're getting close to proxy season for issuers of proxies under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). And, especially since the passage of Dodd-Frank which gave us the new concept of the  (non-binding, but very important) Shareholder Say-On-Pay (SSOP), one of the most important names that we see is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).

In a nutshell, ISS provides a service to institutional shareholders of issuers. By performing their analysis of SSOP proposals, ISS gives its subscribers guidance related to how they should cast their SSOP votes. While I may not sound entirely favorable toward ISS and their opinions in this post, I do think this is a valuable service.

For those people who would like to understand ISS's standards and protocols, they have a fairly detailed website with new practices for 2013 as well as their comprehensive 2012 policies.

Now I quote directly from their comprehensive 2012 policies:

 Egregious pension/SERP (supplemental executive retirement plan) payouts:

§  Inclusion of additional years of service not worked that result in significant benefits provided in new arrangements

§  Inclusion of performance-based equity or other long-term awards in the pension calculation

I could be particularly troubled by what I see there, but it's not what gives me pause. Generally, granting of additional years of service for top executives is not a best practice. Similarly, inclusion of long-term awards in compensation for SERP purposes is not a best practice.

However, ISS appears (emphasis here on appears as compared to has) to have taken the position that having a SERP with a more generous formula than in a qualified plan also constitutes an egregious SERP. Often, they are correct. But, not always.

There is a reason, or at least there ought to be, that SERPs are designed as they are. Some companies, for example, tend to promote from within and their executives will likely be long-service employees who are motivated by retention devices rather than attraction devices. SERPs perform this function well. Freezing a SERP when the qualified defined benefit (DB) plan is frozen may be detrimental to shareholders as executives will no longer be bound by the retention device.

What should ISS do? While I have often said negative things about the Summary Compensation Table (SCT) in the proxy, perhaps the SEC had it somewhat correct when they designed it. While technical pension issues may make the pension data in the proxy less valuable than it otherwise might be, the pension accrual is part of annual compensation.

Now, suppose an executive receives lower direct cash compensation than his peer group (other companies), but receives more in deferred compensation through a SERP. Should this be problematic to shareholders? In my opinion, it should not be. In fact, since direct cash compensation is the proverbial bird in the hand while deferred compensation may not be paid if the company suffers particularly adverse business circumstances such as bankruptcy, the generous SERP in lieu of generous current cash may actually be more desirable. But, it's not viewed that way.

New methodologies allow reviewers of proxies to better make this analysis. I'm working on a paper that will explain this in more detail. Regular readers will see it here.

Incentive Compensation Arrangements Under Dodd-Frank

The sky must be falling, or perhaps it has fallen already. There is no other possible explanation. On Monday, February 7, the following alphabet soup of government agencies published proposed rules under the incentive compensation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act:

• Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
• Federal Reserve System (Fed)
• Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
• Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
• National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)
• Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
• Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)

Surely my eyes deceive me in reading this: http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2011rule2.pdf

Not only are these agencies telling large banks (assets of $50 Billion US or more) how to pay their executives, they are telling the executives (and other individuals who could subject the banks to significant risks) that they must defer large chunks of their incentive payments.

Don't get me wrong. I'm in the line of people who would tell you that many of these banks overcompensated these same people while some of these banks were in danger of failing (or did fail) without government intervention. Some of these banks did not come close to failing. They already have policies and procedures in place. Who decided that they federal government should have this kind of control? Surely, they have overstepped their bounds.

Before describing the source of my indignation, I must pause to explain what is meant for purposes of this regulation by the term, executive officer. It is any person (without regard to title, salary or compensation) who holds the title or functions as the President, Chief Executive Officer, executive Chairman, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Investment Officer, Chief Lending Officer, Chief Legal Officer, Chief Risk Officer, or is head of a major business line (major business line appears to be undefined).

So, what's the buzz, tell me what's a happening (with apologies to Webber and Rice for pilfering from Jesus Christ Superstar)?

I summarize for these Large Covered Financial Institutions:

• at least 50% of the compensation of executive officers would need to be deferred for a period of at least three years
• deferred amounts paid must be adjusted for actual losses or other measures or aspects or performance that are realized or become better known over the deferral period
• the release of deferrals may be as rapid as pro rata over the three-year (or longer) period
• the agencies seek comment on many things, including whether the mandatory deferral period should be longer
• the Board (or a Board committee) of each of these organizations must similarly evaluate the incentive-based compensation of other individuals who could expose the organization to high levels of risk

These are too many rules. And, these rules punish the innocent equally with the guilty. Apparently, clawbacks and similar mechanisms are not sufficient. These rules are taking business judgment out of the rulebook for the financial institutions that already have appropriate controls in place.

This could have been done differently. If we had let the banks that had been mismanaged fail, the survivors would have been rewarded for their prudence and they could continue to compensate their key people prudently. But, more regulation leads to more regulation leads to more regulation leads to weakening (rather than strengthening) of the industry.

In case you weren't sure, I don't like it.