4 Problems at the Intersection of Finance and HR

They are two of the most visible departments in corporations even though neither directly produces revenue, but does require expenditures -- Finance and HR. Historically, they have been at odds neither particularly caring about the worries of the other despite being inextricably linked. This occurs in many ways, but I'm going to focus on four in the order that they seem to arise:

1. Recruiting
2. Cost control and stability
3. Retention
4. Workforce transition

Of course there are many more, but I have some thoughts that link all four of these together. In 2019, that's not always easy as there are constant pushes in Congress to tell employers how much they must pay, which benefits they must provide, and at what costs. How then does one company differentiate itself from another?

To the extent possible, every employer today seems to offer teleworking, flexible work hours, and paid time off banks. While they once were, those are no longer differentiators. After the Affordable Care Act took effect, the health plans at Company X started to look a lot like the health plans at Company Y.

I have a different idea and while I am probably biased by my consulting focus, I am also biased by research that I read. Employees are worried about retiring someday. They are worried about whether they will have enough money or even if they have any way of knowing if they will have enough money. They are worried about outliving their wealth (or lack thereof). They are worried about having the means to support their health in retirement.

I know -- you think I have veered horribly from my original thesis. We're coming back.

Today, most good-sized companies have 401(k) plans and in an awful lot of those cases, they are safe harbor plans. They are an expectation, so having one does not help you the employer in recruiting. While once they had pizzazz, today they are routine. 

Cost stability seems a given, but it's not. Common benchmarks for the success of a 401(k) plan including the percentage of employees that participate at various levels. You score better if your employees do participate and at higher levels. But, that costs more money.

If there's nothing about that program that sets you apart, it doesn't help you to retain your employees. And, as we all have learned, the cost of unwanted turnover is massive often exceeding a year's salary. In other words, if you lose a desirable employee earning $100,000 per year, it is estimated that the total true cost of replacing her is about $100,000. That would have paid for a lot of years of retirement plan costs for her.

There will come a time, however, that our desirable employee thinks it's time to retire. But, she's not certain if she is able. And, even if she works out that she is able, retirement is so sudden. One day, she's getting up and working all nine to five and the next, she has to fill that void. Wouldn't it be great to be able to transition her into retirement gradually while she transitions her skills and knowledge to her replacement?

You need a differentiator. You need something different, exciting, and better. You need to be the kid on the block that everyone else envies. 

You would be the envy of all the others if you won at recruiting, kept your costs level (as a percentage of payroll) and on budget, retained key employees, and had a vehicle that allows for that smooth transition.

I had a conversation with a key hiring executive earlier this month. He said he cannot get mid-career people to come to his organization from [and he mentioned another peer organization]. He was exasperated. He said, "We're better and everyone knows it, but their best people won't come over." I asked him why. He said, "It's that pension and I can't get one put in here." I asked him to tell me more and he explained it as one of those new-fangled cash balance plans with guaranteed return of principal -- i.e., no investment risk for participants, professionally managed assets, the ability to receive 401(k) rollovers, and the option to take a lump sum or various annuity options at retirement. He said that it's the "talk of the town over there" and that even though it seems mundane when you first hear about it, it's their differentiator and it wins for them.

We talked for a while. He wants one. He wants one for himself and he wants one to be as special as his competitor. He wants to be envied too. We talked more.

Stay tuned for their new market-based cash balance plan ... maybe. He and I hope that maybe becomes reality.

A Less Expensive Way to Provide Better Retirement Benefits -- DB

I've been pushing defined benefit (DB) plans hard lately. I still believe in them. The problem as I have noted is that regulators don't. They have done everything they can to kill them. Many are gone, many remain.

Yesterday, I happened upon a brief from Boston College's Center for Retirement Research. If you want, you can get the full brief here. In the brief, based on 23 years of data, Alicia Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, and Caroline Crawford -- all from the CCRC -- demonstrate that returns on assets in DB plans actually are better than those in defined contribution (DC) plans.

When you combine this with the inability of many to defer enough to their 401(k) plans to get the full company match, you can see why many will never be able to retire well with a 401(k) as their core retirement plan.

For years, though, the cry has been that people understand 401(k) plans, but don't understand DB. But, suppose I gave you a DB plan that looked like a DC plan, provided returns for participants like a particularly well-invested DC plan, provided better downside investment return protection than a DC plan, and cost the employer less than a DC plan. What would you think?

In the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (yes, that was more than 9 years ago), Congress sanctioned what are now known as market return cash balance plans. What they are are DB plans that look like DC plans to participants, provide more and better opportunities for participants to elect annuity forms of distribution if they like, and provide the opportunity for plan sponsors to control costs and create almost a perfect investment hedge if they choose.

Suppose you had such a plan. Suppose to participants looking at their retirement website, the plan just looked like another account any day they chose to look. Suppose the costs were stable. Suppose the plan provided you as a sponsor more flexibility.

That would be nirvana in Xanadu, or something like that, wouldn't it?

Another Viewpoint on Retirement -- Has the 401(k) System Failed?

Our Ridiculous Approach to Retirement - NYTimes.com

Last Sunday, Theresa Ghilarducci, a career retirement policy person and now Professor of Economics at the New School for Social Research wrote this interesting piece for the New York Times. In it, Ms. Ghilarducci's penultimate paragraph reads as follows:

It is now more than 30 years since the 401(k)/Individual Retirement Account model appeared on the scene. This do-it-yourself pension system has failed. It has failed because it expects individuals without expertise to reap the same results as professional investors and money managers. What results would you expect if you were to pull your own teeth or do your own electrical wiring?

In the article, she makes some very interesting points. Most people underestimate what they need to live well in retirement. One of her observations, however, is exceedingly important and rarely raised; that is, the probability that your last dollar will run out on the day you die is essentially zero, and if we take it to the moment you die, that probability, for the math geeks out there, is approximately epsilon (for you non-math geeks, that means it's not going to happen).

Put differently, this implies that you need to have more money in savings than you will need. But, all this is based on life expectancy. That's a median. Fully half the population will outlive that median. So, they need more. Do you know if you are part of that half? By how much will you outlive that life expectancy? Don't know that either, do you?

Clearly, the solution lies in lifetime income options, preferably with inflation protection. Where can you find that? It's tough. You can take your assets and find an annuity salesperson who will sell you such a product, although there aren't many such products around. And, given that there aren't many products, they are not priced fairly to the consumer. Then, there is the in-plan lifetime income option. But, I spoke to representative from a large 401(k) provider the other day who said that their research suggests that neither plan sponsors nor their employers currently want them.

So, how do you get lifetime income options? Defined benefit plans? You remember them, they used to be popular. Has anyone considered a low-risk (for the employer) defined benefit solution that might help to solve this problem? Sadly, the law has made this very difficult. But, consider this hypothetical design:

• Cash balance style
• There is a non-elective employer "pay credit" and a matching employer pay credit on employee contributions (this is not currently allowed)
• Inflation-protected annuities as a distribution option

What do you think? I'd love your comments, pro or con, serious or even with a little humor.

Accounting for Pension Buy-Ins

Over the last several years, so called pension buy-ins have become fairly popular in Europe. Just recently, the first one in a US qualified defined benefit plan was completed. The questions beg:

• What is a pension buy-in?
• How does the plan sponsor account for such a transaction? [NOTE: the author is not an accountant and does not provide accounting advice, but has drawn upon writings from and conversations with several large accounting firms.]

Briefly, here is how a pension buy-in works (from the standpoint of the plan sponsor). The plan purchases a contract from an insurer. When a benefit payment comes due for a participant covered by the buy-in, the plan pays that amount to the participant and the insurer pays an equal amount to the plan. Economically, this feels a lot like a buy-out contract where the plan purchases annuities from an insurer and the insurer pays all future benefits. The two contracts are probably priced the same as the insurer bears the same risk in each case. In the typical buy-in arrangement, the plan sponsor has the right to convert from a buy-in to a buy-out at no additional cost.

Buy-outs tend to generate what is know as settlement accounting under ASC 715 (previously FAS 88). In order for a transaction to be a settlement, it must satisfy a three-prong test:

1. The action must be irrevocable.
2. The action must relieve the plan sponsor of primary responsibility for the obligation being settled.
3. With respect to the plan sponsor, the event must eliminate significant risks related to the obligations and assets used to effect the transaction.

Buy-ins, as currently structured should not generate settlement accounting, despite the visually identical economics. Here is why.

• Typically, the action is not irrevocable as the contract often can be undone.
• Because the insurer could become insolvent and because the plan will own the contract, neither the plan nor the plan sponsor has eliminated significant risks with respect to the obligations and assets.

So, for accounting purposes, the plan is left with the same obligations it had before and a sizable asset of a type not previously considered in the accounting literature. We then ask how should this new-fangled asset be valued. After consideration of the thoughts of accounting professionals, we conclude that there are two options. First, the contract can be valued (essentially as an obligation), but using the rate at which such asset could be sold. The accounting profession seems to me to think that the current (at the measurement date) PBGC rates for single-employer pension annuities may be an appropriate discount rate. Second, and perhaps more intuitive to me, both the asset and the associated obligation would be valued at the discount rate at which such obligation could effectively be settled.

Under the first approach, the asset will likely exceed its associated obligation. Under the second approach, they will be identical. 

"I see", said the blind man.

So, there you have it. If my reading of the tea leaves is correct, it goes like this. A buy-out generates settlement accounting. A buy-in with the same economics does not, but it does give the plan sponsor a choice of two methods of accounting one of which will produce a smaller annual pension expense than the other.