On ISS and SERPs

We're getting close to proxy season for issuers of proxies under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). And, especially since the passage of Dodd-Frank which gave us the new concept of the  (non-binding, but very important) Shareholder Say-On-Pay (SSOP), one of the most important names that we see is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).

In a nutshell, ISS provides a service to institutional shareholders of issuers. By performing their analysis of SSOP proposals, ISS gives its subscribers guidance related to how they should cast their SSOP votes. While I may not sound entirely favorable toward ISS and their opinions in this post, I do think this is a valuable service.

For those people who would like to understand ISS's standards and protocols, they have a fairly detailed website with new practices for 2013 as well as their comprehensive 2012 policies.

Now I quote directly from their comprehensive 2012 policies:

 Egregious pension/SERP (supplemental executive retirement plan) payouts:

§  Inclusion of additional years of service not worked that result in significant benefits provided in new arrangements

§  Inclusion of performance-based equity or other long-term awards in the pension calculation

I could be particularly troubled by what I see there, but it's not what gives me pause. Generally, granting of additional years of service for top executives is not a best practice. Similarly, inclusion of long-term awards in compensation for SERP purposes is not a best practice.

However, ISS appears (emphasis here on appears as compared to has) to have taken the position that having a SERP with a more generous formula than in a qualified plan also constitutes an egregious SERP. Often, they are correct. But, not always.

There is a reason, or at least there ought to be, that SERPs are designed as they are. Some companies, for example, tend to promote from within and their executives will likely be long-service employees who are motivated by retention devices rather than attraction devices. SERPs perform this function well. Freezing a SERP when the qualified defined benefit (DB) plan is frozen may be detrimental to shareholders as executives will no longer be bound by the retention device.

What should ISS do? While I have often said negative things about the Summary Compensation Table (SCT) in the proxy, perhaps the SEC had it somewhat correct when they designed it. While technical pension issues may make the pension data in the proxy less valuable than it otherwise might be, the pension accrual is part of annual compensation.

Now, suppose an executive receives lower direct cash compensation than his peer group (other companies), but receives more in deferred compensation through a SERP. Should this be problematic to shareholders? In my opinion, it should not be. In fact, since direct cash compensation is the proverbial bird in the hand while deferred compensation may not be paid if the company suffers particularly adverse business circumstances such as bankruptcy, the generous SERP in lieu of generous current cash may actually be more desirable. But, it's not viewed that way.

New methodologies allow reviewers of proxies to better make this analysis. I'm working on a paper that will explain this in more detail. Regular readers will see it here.

How Companies Can Piss Off Shareholders

I thought this might be a provocative title for a blog post: "How Companies Can Piss Off Shareholders". Frankly, if you are expecting a full discourse on all the ways this can be done, you've come to the wrong place. The seminal piece on this is undoubtedly the ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) 2011-2012 Policy Survey Summary of Results. And, for that matter, if you really want a more thoughtful analysis of the entire survey, I would direct you to Mike Melbinger's latest blog post on this topic.

ISS would never say anything like the title of this post. And, Mike Melbinger, while I love his blog, tends to be more politically correct than yours truly. If you came here to read about this, then you are looking to see someone fall. Knives in the back are fair game. So are sucker punches below the belt. Here, the only rules are the Truth According to Me (apologies to John Irving and T.S. Garp).

So, between the strategically chosen dates of July 6 and August 26 of 2011 (after people came back from celebrating our nation's birthday and before they left to celebrate labor (the kind that you get paid for, not the kind that causes expectant mothers to scream)), ISS asked a whole bunch of questions of both investors (institutional shareholders) and issuers (companies that issue proxies to their shareholders).

Before getting into the nitty gritty, though, I feel the need to digress. Has a body as educated and seemingly intelligent as ISS not made it through 3rd grade math? In their introductory remarks, ISS notes that "[M]ore than 335 total responses were received. A total of 138 institutions responded. ... 197 corporate issuers responded ... ." I got out my handy-dandy calculator which in my case sits somewhere north of my neck (traditional calculators have a tendency in my world to hide themselves under stacks of paper, but my calculator always seems to live in about the same place, covered with some hair in strategically chosen places) and added 138 to 197. Hmm? The total was 335. It was not more than 335. Come on, ISS, this is simple stuff. Editors, though, have a problem with starting sentences with a number, so they use silly terms like more than to mean exactly.

OK, enough on that rant ...

In any event, ISS does an outstanding job with their report. Right up front, they summarize key findings. And, for the upcoming proxy season, the #1 governance issue cited by 60% of investor respondents and 61% of issuer respondents is Executive Compensation. Said differently: if a company wants to piss off its shareholders, the #1 way is to compensate its executives in a manner or amount that does not align with shareholder goals. Other top issues for shareholders were Board independence, shareholder rights, and risk oversight, in that order. For companies, the only issue other than executive compensation receiving more than a 30% vote was risk oversight.

Later on, ISS drills down (I've never used that term in writing before, but I felt the need today). Some of the findings that I found interesting were these:

• 62% of investors find it very relevant (negatively so) when executives are paid significantly higher than their peer group.
• 88% of investors find it very relevant if pay levels have increased disproportionately to the company's performance.
• While issuers generally do not feel compelled to respond to a say-on-pay vote until the dissenting vote has approached or reached 50%, nearly half (48%) of investors feel that an issuer should provide an explicit response when the no votes reach 20% or even less.

Institutional shareholders are very serious about say-on-pay. Companies that ignore this are seeing two phenomena -- contested elections of Directors and shareholder lawsuits against the Board of Directors. 

For companies that may be headed down a path of compensation that could get a lot of no votes, they need to do a lot of planning and explain their decisions up front. Right up there near the top of problematic pay practices are egregious SERPs. Sometimes, they are justifiable, and other times, ...

Caveat enditor!